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ABSTRACT 
Although numerous studies have documented an association between discrimination and 
internalizing psychopathology, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work that establishes 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms through which racial discrimination leads to these 
outcomes in African Americans. The goal of this study was to test a new etiological model of the 
role of racial discrimination in the development of anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and 
anhedonia. The overarching model proposed that frequent exposure to racial discrimination (i.e., 
blatant racism, racial microaggressions, and gendered racial microaggressions) may lead to 
anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and anhedonia through the development of maladaptive 
cognitive processes (i.e., anticipatory race-related fear, anticipatory race-related anxiety, 
rumination/hopelessness) the effects of which are conditional based on psychopathology-relevant 
cognitive vulnerabilities (i.e., attention bias to threat, inhibition difficulty). A total of 250 African 
American participants (73% women) completed the study. For anxious arousal, we found the 
indirect effect of racial discrimination (blatant racism and racial microaggressions) through 
anticipatory race-related fear depended on degree of attention bias, with the effect only reaching 
statistical significance at high levels of attention bias to threat. For anxious apprehension, we 
found that the small indirect effect of racial discrimination (blatant racism and gendered racial 
microaggressions) through anticipatory race-related anxiety did not depend on the degree of 
attention bias, but the effect only reached statistical significance at low levels of attention bias to 
threat. For anhedonia, the indirect effect of racial discrimination through rumination was 
significant regardless of inhibition capacity, whereas the indirect effect of racial discrimination 
through hopefulness was only statistically significant among people with greater inhibition 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
African Americans are understudied by researchers and underserved by mental health 
care professionals in part because we lack a clear understanding of how experiences unique to 
African Americans may play a role in their mental health. For example, African Americans are 
less likely to participate in psychological research and more likely to drop out of longitudinal 
studies of health and wellbeing (Radler & Ryff, 2010), limiting our understanding of 
internalizing psychopathology in African Americans. As a result, despite relatively similar rates 
of disorders such as major depressive disorder or generalized anxiety disorder (e.g., Horwath, 
Johnson, & Hornig, 1994; Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson, & Kessler, 1996; Kessler et al., 2005; 
Merikangas et al., 2007), African Americans are less likely to seek treatment than Whites (Wang 
et al., 2005). Moreover, when African Americans do seek treatment, they are more likely to drop 
out (Lester, Resick, Artz & Young-Xu, 2010; Sue et al., 1991) and less likely benefit from 
treatment compared to Whites, suggesting lower relative efficacy of treatments (Alegria et al., 
2008; Friedman, Braunstein, & Halpern, 2006; Carter, Riley, Sbrocco & Mitchell, 2012; 
Windsor, Jemal, & Alessi, 2014). Taken together, this research highlights the importance of 
conducting research specifically designed to understand the development and maintenance of 
mood and anxiety symptoms in this population.  
Such research may include developing and testing culturally-informed etiological models 
that assess and integrate both universalities and diversities in the experience of psychopathology 
(Leininger, 2007). To address this serious gap in the literature, the proposed model examines 
how race-relevant variables interact with mental health variables (e.g., attention to threat, 
impaired cognitive inhibition) to confer psychopathology risk in African Americans. In general, 
this model does not conceptualize the abstract concept of race as a “causal” variable in and of 
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itself. Instead, race is conceptualized as a construct that may influence the likelihood of 
encountering particular experiences, and thus may be thought of as a proxy for indicating a 
shared set of likely experiences among some group members. These shared experiences, in turn, 
may influence the phenomenology of psychopathology in meaningful ways. One such set of 
shared experiences that may be especially relevant to mental health, racial discrimination, is the 
focus of the proposed study.  
Racial Discrimination and Mental Health 
Racial discrimination remains a public health problem for African Americans (Harrell, 
Hall, & Taliaferro, 2003; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003). Racial discrimination is 
defined as the subjective experience of discriminatory behavior on the basis of one’s race (Clark 
et al., 1999; Utsey, 1998). This may include experiences of individual-level discrimination, 
including being subjected to blatant prejudice (e.g., hostile statements about one’s race) and 
subtle prejudice (e.g., racially microaggressive statements), as well as systemic discrimination 
(e.g., denial of housing or educational opportunities; Landrine & Klonoff, 1996; Utsey, 1998). 
The overwhelming majority of African Americans experience racial discrimination during their 
lifetime, and 80-98% report experiencing discrimination in the last year (Gibbons et al., 2004; 
Klonoff & Landrine, 1999; Seaton, Caldwell, Sellers, & Jackson, 2008). Given the 
overwhelming prevalence of racial discrimination occurring at individual and systemic levels, it 
is imperative for researchers to identify feasible and effective interventions to mitigate its 
occurrence. Though the onus is on individuals and systems in positions of power to work against 
individual and structural racism, people of color must nevertheless cope with the consequences 
of racial discrimination until such a lofty goal is met. Thus, though people of color are 
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indubitably not to blame for racial discrimination, they must still contend with its numerous 
consequences.  
The extant literature suggests that experiences of racial discrimination may have 
deleterious physical (Mays, Cochran & Barnes, 2007) and mental health outcomes for African 
Americans (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & William, 1999; Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999; 
Pieterse, Todd, Neville, & Carter, 2012;). Specifically, experiences of discrimination have been 
associated with greater likelihood of experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression (Burt, 
Simons, & Gibbons, 2012; Matthews et al., 2013; Soto, Dawson-Andoh, & BeLue, 2011). 
Though numerous studies have documented the existence of a correlation between racial 
discrimination and internalizing psychopathology (i.e., anxiety and depression symptoms), there 
is a lack of theoretical and empirical work that establishes cognitive and emotional mechanisms 
through which racial discrimination leads to these outcomes over time. By identifying such 
mechanisms, researchers will be able to gain a broader understanding of how racial 
discrimination affects mental health and use it to inform models of psychopathology and 
treatment for people of color.  
The most well-delineated model, referred to as a biopsychosocial model of racism as a 
stressor, conceptualizes racial discrimination as a culturally relevant stressor with various 
physiological (e.g., cortisol increase) and psychological (e.g., anger) responses (Clark et al., 
1999). According to this theory, there are various factors that influence the likelihood of 
perceiving an environmental stressor as discriminatory, such as one’s socioeconomic status or 
skin tone. Over time and in conjunction with various factors (e.g., ineffective coping strategies), 
perceiving events as racially discriminatory is theorized to impact health negatively by depleting 
physiological and psychological resources.  
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Though the biopsychosocial theory offers a rich understanding of how various factors 
may influence the likelihood of perceiving events as discriminatory and lead to distress, it is 
limited in its clinical utility for several reasons. First, though it highlights the role of state 
emotions in reaction to individual instances of racial discrimination, it does not explain how 
chronic racial discrimination can influence trait-like emotional states and cognitive processes 
(e.g., ineffective thought patterns), which have been identified as important transdiagnostic 
components of psychopathology (Harvey, Watkins, Masell & Shafran, 2004). Second, it does not 
identify vulnerability factors that may influence the extent to which racial discrimination confers 
psychopathology risk, thereby undermining its predictive utility.  Finally, it lacks etiological 
specificity in predicting outcomes, thereby reducing its clinical utility. Thus, an integrative 
theoretical model incorporating cognitive mechanisms and vulnerability factors predicting 
specific outcomes is needed to better understand the psychological factors that explain how 
racial discrimination may be associated with mental health.  
Internalizing Psychopathology 
Meta-analyses of the association between racial discrimination and mental health report 
the strongest associations with internalizing symptoms in African Americans relative to other 
forms of psychopathology (Paradies, 2006; Pascoe & Richman, 2009; Pieterse et al., 2012). 
These emotional reactions can vary, with some individuals reporting symptoms of anxiety, and 
others reporting symptoms of depression (Carter, 2007; Carter & Forsyth, 2010). Given the high 
rate of co-occurrence of anxiety and depression symptoms and the diversity within anxiety 
symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1991), it is therefore important to investigate psychological 
constructs that are unique to depression and anxiety in order to understand their specific 
etiological pathways as they relate to the experience of racial discrimination. Indeed, there is 
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evidence that anxiety and depression symptoms share negative affect, but can also be 
differentiated, with anxiety characterized by increased arousal (i.e., anxious arousal) and 
depression characterized by loss of interest and low positive affect (i.e., anhedonic depression: 
Watson & Clark, 1991). Anxious arousal refers to a stable pattern of experiencing physiological, 
rather than cognitive, aspects of anxiety (e.g., hyperarousal, somatic tension) in reaction to mild 
threats (Sharp, Miller, & Heller, 2015), while anhedonia refers to an absence of pleasurable 
experiences (Watson et al., 1995). Psychometric work has established unique, but correlated, 
scales that index anxious arousal and anhedonic depression (e.g., Nitschke, Heller, Imig, 
McDonald, & Miller, 2001; Watson et al., 1995). Moreover, psychophysiological research 
suggests that anxious arousal and anhedonic depression are associated with different patterns of 
brain activation (e.g., Engels et al., 2007; Heller, et al., 1997; Keller et al., 2000), further 
supporting this distinction. Building on this model, Nitschke et al. (2001) argue for the presence 
of a third dimension and provide psychometric evidence to suggest that in addition to anxious 
arousal and anhedonic depression, anxious apprehension (i.e., worry) is a distinct component of 
internalizing psychopathology. Growing evidence suggests that though anxious apprehension 
and anxious arousal are highly correlated, they are nonetheless distinct and may have unique 
pathways and can be characterized by unique patterns of brain activation (Nitschke, Heller, 
Palmieri, & Miller, 1999). Thus, this study focuses on three related but unique components of 
internalizing psychopathology disorders: anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and anhedonic 
depression.   
Cognitive theories of anxiety and depression suggest that different cognitive 
characteristics and/or biases may be more likely to lead to the development of anxious arousal 
(e.g., biased attention toward threat; Abramson et al., 1989; Beck & Clark, 1997; Byrne & 
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Eysenck, 1995; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), anxious apprehension 
(e.g., avoidance of threat; Borkovec, 1995), or depression (e.g., deficits in executive function; 
Letkiewicz et al., 2014). Research on factors that maintain internalizing symptoms has found 
unique maladaptive (i.e., ineffective) cognitive processing biases associated with anxiety and 
depression symptoms. Anxious individuals, for example, tend to over-anticipate threat and report 
experiencing hypervigilance (Richards et al., 2014). Depressed individuals, on the other hand, 
engage in ruminative thinking and report experiencing hopelessness (Gibb, Beevers, Andover, & 
Holleran, 2007; Wagner, Alloy, & Abramson, 2015).  
Thus, there is considerable evidence that depression and anxiety may be characterized by 
unique etiologies. However, the literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical model that can 
explain the interactive roles of cognitive vulnerabilities, chronic racial discrimination, and 
maladaptive cognitive processes in the development of anxious arousal, anxious apprehension 
and anhedonia. Thus, this study aims to build on previous theories of both racism-related stress 
and psychopathology by proposing and testing a nuanced cognitive-emotional model that 
elucidates differential etiological pathways through which racial discrimination can lead to 
symptoms of anxiety and depression (see Figure 1a). Specifically, the model proposes that 
chronic exposure to racial discrimination may lead to anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and 
anhedonia through the development of maladaptive cognitive processes (mediators) that are 
differentially predicted by psychopathology-relevant vulnerabilities (moderators). Maladaptive 
cognitive processes are defined as patterns of negative thinking, attention orienting, and 
information processing. They are considered “maladaptive” only in that they are known to be 
associated with negative outcomes, not as an evaluative judgment on individuals’ coping 
strategies. In this model, maladaptive cognitive processes are theorized to be mediators in the 
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racial discrimination-psychopathology association, meaning that there should be an indirect 
effect of racial discrimination on psychopathology (i.e., anxious arousal, anxious apprehension 
and anhedonia) through cognitive processes. Cognitive vulnerabilities, on the other hand, are 
defined as any trait that confers risk for the development or experience of psychopathology (Just, 
Abramson, & Alloy, 2001). These factors may, at the same time, function as maintenance factors 
through which psychopathology persists. The lack of cognitive vulnerabilities – or strength in a 
particular domain – may simultaneously be considered protective factors; such that their absence 
decreases the probability of experiencing psychopathology. In this model (see Figure 1), 
cognitive vulnerabilities are theorized to be moderators of the mediated link between racial 
discrimination and psychopathology, meaning that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on 
psychopathology (i.e., anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and anhedonia) through cognitive 
processes will be conditional on the degree of cognitive vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER 2: ANXIOUS AROUSAL AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Model 1 Summary 
The proposed model predicts that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious 
arousal through anticipatory race-related fear will be conditional on the degree of attentional bias 
toward threat, such that the indirect effect of racial discrimination will be larger among 
individuals who have difficulty disengaging from threat (see Figure 2a).  
Anxious Arousal and Anticipatory Race-Related Fear  
Fear has been conceptualized as a physical and emotional response that functions to 
preserve life (Sylvers, Lilienfeld & LaPrairie, 2011). Based on evolutionary theories, there is 
support for the idea that the physiological experience of fear functions to motivate a defensive 
response as a means of survival (Mineka & Ohman, 2002). Thus, a fear response can be thought 
of as a strategy to prepare for and effectively cope with threat. One type of chronic, 
unpredictable threat that may be especially salient to African Americans is race-related threat. 
Thus, anticipatory race-related fear refers to a fear response (e.g., trembling, heart racing) that 
occurs in response to thinking about experiencing future racial discrimination (Utsey et al, 2013). 
Specifically, this model proposes that more frequent direct and indirect experiences with racial 
discrimination may increase individuals’ fear response to a future race-related threat.  
Amidst well-publicized instances of blatant racial discrimination occurring across the 
country (e.g., disproportionate police shootings of unarmed African Americans; Moore, 
Robinson, & Adedoyin, 2016; Rembert, Watson & Hill, 2016), African Americans may develop 
a fear response to the thought of experiencing racial discrimination. In line with social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which posits that one’s own identity and sense of self are tied to 
the social groups in which they belong, it is likely that in-group members’ experiences of racial 
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discrimination may also influence these expectations. Interpreting a police shooting of an 
unarmed African American as an instance of racial discrimination, for example, may influence 
the fear of threat even if the event did not occur to that individual person.  
In support of this idea, a qualitative study examining the ways in which African 
American parents interpreted and discussed the death of unarmed African American teenager 
Trayvon Martin with their children, found that parents engaged in various strategies based on the 
implicit assumption that other African Americans’ experiences have some bearing on their own 
lives (Thomas & Blackmon, 2015). For example, one parent interprets the shooting of Trayvon 
Martin by saying, “[The shooting] reinforces how vigilant [our children] need to be in decision 
making and discernment— reading and determining the actions of others” (Thomas & Blackmon, 
2015; p. 81). Another explained the shooting to their children by saying, “[My children] must 
continue to watch their backs. Whites continue to oppress us and justice does not serve us as it 
should.” Thus, experiences with racial discrimination – whether to the individual or to members 
of their group – may influence the degree to which an African American individual experiences 
anticipatory fear. Summarizing the experience of race-related anticipatory fear reported by their 
participants, Feagin and Sikes (1994) write,  
Blacks must be constantly aware of possible responses to chronic discrimination. One 
older respondent spoke of having to put on her ‘‘shield’’ just before she leaves the house 
each morning… she said that for more than six decades, as she leaves her home, she has 
tried to be prepared for insults and discrimination in public places, even if nothing 
happens that day (Feagin & Sikes 1994, p. 115; cited in Hicken et al., 2013). 
While anticipatory fear can be adaptive in that one is theoretically better able to identify and 
therefore respond to threat, it is possible that it may have unintended consequences in terms of 
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mental health outcomes. For example, if individuals chronically experience this fear activation in 
response to race-related threat, it may lead individuals to experience more frequent symptoms of 
anxious arousal. Thus, racial discrimination may cause individuals to develop anticipatory fear 
related to racial discrimination, which, in turn, may lead to greater instances of physiological fear 
responses (e.g., heart racing, sweating) that characterize anxious arousal.  
Attention to Threat as a Moderator 
Given that the majority of individuals who experience racial discrimination do not 
develop anxiety symptoms, it is likely that some vulnerability (and protective) factors may 
moderate the degree to which racial discrimination affects anxious arousal through anticipatory 
race-related fear. Literature on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a disorder containing 
hyperarousal as a diagnostic criterion, is especially concerned about vulnerability and 
maintenance of hyperarousal symptoms. Research aiming to better understand the persistence of 
hyperarousal within the context of trauma has implicated difficulty with fear inhibition as an 
important vulnerability factor (Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010; Jovanovic et al., 2010). From a 
neurobiological perspective, Brenmer et al. (1999) theorize that the response in biological 
systems implementing fear responses may be so strong that typical inhibitory processes are 
insufficient. Furthermore, using a longitudinal design, Sijbrandij, Engelhard, Lommen, Leer & 
Baas (2013) found that fear inhibition predicted the persistence of PTSD symptoms over time. 
Importantly, difficulty with inhibiting response to fearful stimuli may have important 
implications for attentional processes related to engagement with threat.  
In line with this, research on cognitive vulnerability to anxiety symptoms has provided 
evidence that attention bias to threat, defined as difficulty disengaging from threatening stimuli, 
may be the consequence of this difficulty with fear inhibition (Richards et al., 2014). Thus, 
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individuals may be attending to threat as a function of difficulty inhibiting a fear response. 
Interestingly, Fani et al., (2012) found that among a predominately African American sample 
who experienced severe trauma, those meeting the criteria for PTSD had greater attentional 
biases to threat, and that this bias was associated with greater fear responses in a laboratory 
paradigm. They found that this attention bias was specific to threatening White (but not African 
American) faces, suggesting that race may influence the way individuals attend to threatening 
stimuli.  
Based on this research, it is therefore possible that the extent to which individuals are 
able to disengage from threatening stimuli (i.e., inhibit fear) may influence the degree to which 
racial discrimination may lead to anticipatory race-related fear and consequent anxious arousal. 
For example, two individuals may experience the same degree of racial discrimination and 
consequent anticipatory fear response, but the degree to which each individual is able to 
disengage from threatening stimuli may influence the likelihood of developing anxious arousal 
symptoms. Thus, the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious arousal through 
anticipatory race-related fear may be contingent on individuals’ inability to disengage from 
threatening stimuli.  
Alternatively, it is conceivable that the presence of an anxious temperament increases the 
risk of developing an attention bias to threat (Perez-Edgar et al., 2010), which, in combination 
with the experience of chronic racial discrimination, leads to anticipatory race-related fear. In 
other words, anxious temperament may function as an affective vulnerability to biased attention, 
whereas racial discrimination may function as an environmental vulnerability to anticipatory 
race-related fear. Even in this scenario, however, biased attention toward threat may maintain 
anxious arousal by increasing opportunities for engagement with threatening stimuli. While the 
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temporal sequence of these interdependent factors may only be fully understood using long-term, 
longitudinal methods, testing the proposed model may provide some insight on how these factors 




CHAPTER 3: ANXIOUS APPREHENSION AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Model 2 Summary 
The proposed model predicts that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious 
apprehension through anticipatory race-related anxiety will be conditional on the degree of 
attentional bias toward threat. Two competing hypotheses will be tested to determine whether the 
indirect effect will be larger among individuals who attend to threat or whether it will be larger 
among individuals who avoid threat (see Figure 3a).  
Anxious Apprehension and Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety 
In contrast to fear, which is theoretically a response to certain threat, anxious 
apprehension has been conceptualized as a response to uncertain threat (Sylvers et al., 2011). 
Classic learning theories on anxious apprehension posit that conditioning is a cognitive process 
through which humans reduce uncertainty by developing expectancies about the environment 
(Rescorla, 1988). There is evidence that anxious individuals become conditioned to expect and 
anticipate negative outcomes (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) as a result of a complex interplay of 
vulnerabilities and early social learning history.  
Thus, in line with the rationale of Model 1, chronic experiences of racial discrimination 
may reify the idea that the world is a dangerous place and therefore reinforce the need to 
anticipate and psychologically prepare for potential racial discrimination. This anticipatory race-
related anxiety has been described as a relatively consistent and explicit expectation that one will 
experience future discrimination on account of their race. In support of this theory, one study 
found that experiencing more frequent racial discrimination was associated with anticipating 
greater future racial discrimination (Utsey et al., 2013).  
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One way that individuals may cope with this anticipatory race-related anxiety is to worry. 
To highlight the way in which this may manifest in individuals’ everyday lives, an African 
American woman in Feagin and Sike’s (1994) qualitative study of racial discrimination reported:  
[One problem with] being Black in America is that you have to spend so much time 
thinking about stuff that most white people just don’t even have to think about. I worry 
when I get pulled over by a cop…  I worry when I walk into a store that someone is going 
to think that I am shoplifting. And I have to worry about that because I am not free to 
ignore it (Feagin & Sikes, 1991, p. 114; cited in Hicken et al., 2013). 
For this participant, the worry appears to be driven by a desire to protect herself from 
harm and a belief that this worry is necessary. This is in line with the Contrast Avoidance Model 
of worry (Newman & Llera, 2011), which posits that worry is employed to “prolong and 
maintain a negative emotional state thereby avoiding an unexpected negative emotional shift, or 
contrast experiences” (p. 1). According to this theory, individuals who experience chronic worry 
do so to avoid the vulnerability involved with a negative contrast (i.e., going from a positive 
emotional state to a negative emotional state). Taken from the example above, if this participant 
“expects the worst” (e.g., worries about the possibility of a being accused of shoplifting) she can 
successfully avoid the emotional vulnerability resulting from unexpected racial discrimination. 
This may especially relevant in the context of encounters with law enforcement officers – if an 
African American individual worries about being pulled over while driving, they may feel better 
equipped to handle such a potentially dangerous situation effectively.   
In contrast to this model, Borkovec’s (1995) Cognitive Avoidance Model of worry 
theorizes that individuals worry as a way of avoiding threat. While worrisome cognitions may 
begin as an attempt to problem solve in response to the possibility of threat, they may be 
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maintained by reducing physiological anxiety in the short-term (Borkovec & Hu, 1990) and in 
the long-term, by the development of illusory correlations between worry and reduced risk of 
harm (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). In support of this avoidant function theory, Borkovec 
& Roemer (1995) found that individuals with clinical levels of anxiety were more likely to report 
using worry as a way to distract them from more distressing topics. Despite this empirical 
support, a major critique of this theory is that worry does not, in fact, lead to a reduction in 
negative affect and to the contrary, increases physiological arousal (e.g., Brosschot, van Dijk & 
Thayer, 2002) and self-reported distress (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Thus, there is little consensus 
about the function of anxious apprehension in the literature. Given evidence of various 
mainstream cognitive- and emotion-focused models predicting significantly less variance in 
anxious apprehension among African American (vs. White) samples (Kertz, Bakhti, Stevens & 
Curewitz, 2015), further conceptualization on the role of race in the process of anxious 
apprehension is warranted.  
Moderating Role of Attention Biases 
The degree to which racial discrimination influences anxious apprehension through the 
effect of anticipatory race-related anxiety may be contingent on attentional processes related to 
threat. On one hand, it is possible that attending to threat may function in a similar way to the 
pathway described in Model 1, wherein anticipatory race-related anxiety is only associated with 
anxious apprehension among individuals who have difficulty disengaging from threat. This 
hypothesis is somewhat consistent with the overall rationale for the Contrast Avoidance Model, 
such that the over-engagement with threatening stimuli may lead to and maintain worry by 
prolonging negative affect. On the other hand, it may be that racial discrimination is only 
associated with anxious apprehension through anticipatory race-related anxiety among 
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individuals who avoid threat (i.e., attention bias away from threat). If the function of worrying is 
to avoid processing threatening stimuli, then one would expect an avoidance orientation to threat 
to increase vulnerability to anxious apprehension. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that 
compared to anxious arousal, anxious apprehension is more strongly associated with an avoidant 
motivational style (Spielberg, Heller, Stilton, Stewart, & Miller, 2011).  
From a functional perspective, this relation may exist in part because avoidance prevents 
successful emotional processing (Spielberg et al., 2013), which Rachmann (1980) defines as “a 
return to undisrupted behavior after an emotional disturbance has waned” (p. 54). Successful 
emotional processing necessitates having access to the content of the triggering stimuli and 
pairing this content with “corrective” information (Foa & Kozak, 1986). For example, avoiding 
race-related stimuli may prevent exposure to the distressing emotion, which is necessary in order 
to subsequently pair the stimuli with adaptive information (e.g., “I can handle this”). Absence of 
this pairing – and subsequent failure to habituate – may then increase the uncertainty of future 
threat and lead to greater worry. From a cognitive-behavioral perspective, which emphasizes the 
role of maladaptive beliefs in the development and maintenance of psychopathology, avoidance 
may prevent the testing of maladaptive beliefs (Clark, 1990). For example, if an individual 
worries due to negative beliefs about their ability to handle an imminent interracial interaction, 
avoiding the interaction would preclude the testing of that belief. Thus, the indirect effect of 
racial discrimination on anxious apprehension through anticipatory race-related anxiety may be 
contingent on individuals’ tendency to engage with threat (i.e., biased attention toward threat) or 
disengage from threat (i.e., biased attention away from threat). In this study, we test how 
attention to threat might increase vulnerability to anxious apprehension (in line with the Contrast 
Avoidance theory) or decrease vulnerability (in line with the Cognitive Avoidance theory).  
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CHAPTER 4: ANHEDONIA AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
Model 3 Summary 
The proposed model predicts that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anhedonia 
through rumination and hopelessness will be conditional on the degree of cognitive inhibition, 
such that the indirect effects will be stronger among individuals demonstrating difficulty with 
inhibition (see Figure 4a).  
Racial Discrimination and Rumination 
Rumination refers to past-oriented, negative repetitive thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
Importantly, longitudinal research has found that rumination predicts the onset and duration of 
depressive disorders (Robinson & Alloy, 2003), thereby highlighting its importance as a 
predictor and maintenance factor of depressive symptoms.  In relation to racial ethnic minorities, 
there is support for a positive association between frequency of rumination and experiences of 
racial discrimination (Borders & Liang, 2011; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2009).  
Particular forms of “modern” racial discrimination may be especially conducive to 
ruminative thinking given their often ambiguous nature. One example may be racial 
microaggressions, which are defined by Sue and colleagues (2007) as “brief and commonplace 
daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or 
group” (p. 273). Experiencing a potentially racially microaggressive statement is theorized to 
lead to attributional ambiguity (Major & Crocker, 1993), wherein an individual is unsure 
whether to attribute the behavior to their race, and thus may spend a considerable amount of time 
analyzing the incident to determine its meaning.  For example, Sue and colleagues (2007) 
describe the typical response to experiencing a microaggression as a flurry of questions one asks 
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him or herself, such as, “Did what I think happened, really happen? Was this a deliberate act or 
an unintentional slight? How should I respond? Sit and stew on it or confront the person? If I 
bring the topic up, how do I prove it? Is it worth the effort? Should I just drop the matter?” (p. 
279). This pattern of thinking is consistent with rumination and may influence the development 
of depressive symptoms. Thus far, there is some preliminary support for the mediating role of 
rumination in the perceived discrimination-depression association (Borders & Liang, 2011; 
Miranda, Polanco-Roman, Tsypes & Valderrama, 2013).  
Racial Discrimination and Hopelessness 
 Hope is considered a motivational factor that helps initiate and sustain goals (Ciarrochi et 
al., 2015). The lack of hope (i.e., hopelessness) is defined as negative expectations about one’s 
ability to achieve future outcomes (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989) and has been studied 
extensively in the context of anhedonia. In this model, rumination and hopelessness might have a 
mutually reinforcing effect. Rumination might lead to hopelessness by increasing recall of 
negative memories and reducing problem-solving abilities (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & 
Berg, 1999), thereby reinforcing the belief that there is no hope for change (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Individuals who are more likely to recall negative events (e.g., instances of racial discrimination) 
may then develop a sense of hopelessness about change. Hopelessness may also reinforce 
rumination by interfering with the ability to experience positive affect, and therefore providing 
more opportunities for rumination. This idea is in line with the hopelessness theory of depression, 
which posits that hopelessness, in combination with negative life events increases the risk for 
developing depressive symptoms (Abramson et al., 1989).  
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Given that racial discrimination inherently involves some sort of unfair treatment based 
on race, it is possible that chronic experiences of racial discrimination may lead individuals to 
expect a negative outcome based on their race. Individuals who are hopeless about future events 
(e.g., racial discrimination) for example, may then be more likely to ruminate about their 
inability to change and go on to develop symptoms of anhedonia. In line with this idea, in a 
qualitative study examining students of color’s experiences with racial microaggressions in the 
classroom, Harwood and colleagues (2015) documented an African American male’s experience 
who said, “When I raise my hand, I am often not called upon. After a while, I find myself 
refraining from asking questions” (p.9).  Thus, continued perceived racial discrimination may 
influence feelings of hopelessness, therefore influencing engagement in various activities.  
There is convergent evidence that hopefulness or optimism – theoretically the opposite of 
hopelessness – buffers the effect of some types of racial discrimination on mental health in 
African American students (Lee, Neblett, & Jackson, 2015). Other research conducted with 
African American women in a rural context found that optimism buffered the effect of racial 
discrimination on depressive symptomatology (Odom & Vernon-Feagans, 2010).  
Impaired Cognitive Inhibition as a Moderator  
The degree to which rumination and hopelessness mediate the anhedonia-racial 
discrimination association may depend on the degree of vulnerability in an etiologically-relevant 
factor. One such factor may involve another aspect of attentional control, cognitive inhibition 
(Joormann, & Gotlib, 2010). Cognitive inhibition, which refers to the ability to remove irrelevant 
information from working memory, has been found to be impaired in depressed individuals 
(Crocker et al., 2013; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) and, interestingly, can be negatively impacted 
by situational race-related stressors (i.e., interracial interactions; Richeson, & Shelton, 2003). 
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Furthermore, other studies have found that cognitive inhibition may facilitate the process of 
rumination, such that the degree to which individuals are able to inhibit irrelevant information 
predicts the onset and maintenance of rumination (De Lissnyder, et al., 2012).  
In this model, impaired inhibition is considered a vulnerability factor that influences the 
degree to which rumination and hopelessness mediate the association between racial 
discrimination and anhedonia. Parallel to the example described in the anxiety pathway, two 
individuals may experience the same degree of racial discrimination and consequent rumination 
and hopelessness, but the degree to which each individual is able to inhibit negative or unhelpful 
information (e.g., thoughts of racial discrimination) may influence the likelihood of developing 
anhedonic symptoms. Thus, consistent with Brondolo, Ng, Pierre, & Lane’s (2016) social-
cognitive theory of racism and depression, an inability to inhibit negative stimuli may confer risk 
for the development of anhedonic symptoms via its effect on the relationship between racial 
discrimination and rumination and hopelessness.  
The ability to inhibit, at the same time, may be considered a protective factor in that it 
may decrease the likelihood of ineffective coping (i.e., rumination) and increasing the likelihood 
of effective coping. In fact, a burgeoning literature examining African Americans’ responses to 
racial discrimination has documented a negative association between depression and “active 
coping,” defined as an orientation to problem solving strategies (e.g., West, Donovan, & Roemer, 
2009). Such active coping likely relies on one’s ability to inhibit negative stimuli and shift their 
attention effectively. This may, in turn, reduce the likelihood of developing negative schemas 
about oneself and their group, which has been theorized to play a mediating role in the link 
between racism and depression (Brondolo et al., 2016). Thus, the capacity to inhibit negative 
stimuli may be protective by reducing the effect of hopelessness and rumination on anhedonia.  
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
Participants 
A total of 250 eligible participants completed the study (one additional participant 
completed the study but was excluded due to not meeting race eligibility). The majority of the 
sample identified as women (72.8%, n = 182) and the average age was 19.85 years old (SD = 
3.11). The majority of participants indicated their ethnicity was Black American (74.8%, n = 
187), some indicated they were of African descent (19.2%, n = 48) and a small fraction indicated 
they were of Caribbean descent (2.4%, n = 6) or other (2.4%, n = 6).  
Participants were recruited in one of two ways. The majority of participants (81.2%, n = 
187) were recruited through the subject pool maintained by the psychology department at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and given two course credits for compensation. The 
study was only available to participants who self-identified as African American or Black. 
Eligible students received up to three e-mails per semester informing them of their eligibility for 
this study and inviting them to participate. Second, participants (18.8%, n = 47) were recruited 
through flyers around campus, announcements in African American Studies courses, e-mails sent 
to various leadership organizations, and social media (e.g., Facebook). Participants first 
completed a brief screening survey to determine eligibility. If they were eligible, they indicated 
their preference for appointment times and then were scheduled to come in as soon as possible. 
These participants were compensated with a $15 Amazon Gift Card for completing the study. 
The larger study involves two additional time points, one occurring six months after the 
laboratory session and the second one occurring 18 months after the laboratory session. The 




After being greeted by an experimenter, the study started with a lengthy consent process 
explaining the goals of the study as well as our plan for keeping their data confidential. After 
providing consent, participants created a code that would be used to connect their responses to 
the subsequent time points. In the first part of the study, participants completed a series of 
reaction time tasks (including the Dot Probe and Stroop tasks), which took between 15-20 
minutes to complete. The tasks were run using Inquisit software. The tasks were presented in the 
same order, but the blocks within each task were randomized. At that point, they were offered a 
snack and water and invited to start the second part of the study, which was a series of 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were completed on Qualtrics and were presented in a quasi-
random order (i.e., mental health questionnaires randomized within one block, racial 
discrimination questionnaires were randomized within another block, etc.). On average the 
sessions took about one hour to complete.  
Measures.  
Psychopathology Outcome Variables.  
Anxious arousal. Anxious arousal was measured using the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (MASQ-AA, Watson et al., 1995) anxious arousal subscale, which consists of 17 
items and has been used with African American samples (e.g., Cutrona, Russell, Hessling, 
Brown, & Murry, 2000; Rogin, 1992). Using a time frame of six weeks, participants rated the 
frequency with which they experienced various psychosomatic symptoms and hyperarousal (e.g., 
heart racing was racing, felt tense or “on edge”) on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The 
reliability of the MASQ-AA in this sample was 0.81.  
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Anxious apprehension. Anxious apprehension was measured using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), which has been effectively used 
with African American populations in previous research (e.g., Carter et al., 2005; Chapman, 
Kertz, & Woodruff-Borden, 2009). A total of 16 items measured trait worry (e.g., “I am always 
worrying about something” and “Once I start worrying, I cannot stop”) on a scale of 1 (not at all 
typical of me) to 5 (very typical of me). The reliability of the PSWQ in this sample was 0.91.  
Anhedonia. Anhedonia was measured using the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire ) Anhedonia/Loss of Interest subscale (MASQ-AD/LOI; Watson et al., 1995 
subscale, which consisted of seven items. Using a time frame of six weeks, participants rated the 
frequency with which they experienced symptoms related to loss of pleasure (e.g., “Felt like 
there wasn’t anything interesting or fun to do,” and “Felt like nothing was very enjoyable”) on a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The reliability of the MASQ-AD/LOI in this sample was 
0.81. 
Racial Discrimination Predictor Variables 
 To assess racial discrimination, we used three related but conceptually distinct indicators. 
The first assessed experiences with blatant racial discrimination, the second assessed experiences 
with racial microaggressions, and the third – administered only to self-identified women – 
assessed gendered racial microaggressions.   
Blatant racism. To measure experiences of blatant racism, participants completed the 
Schedule of Racist Events (SRE; Landrine & Klonoff, 1996), which consists of 17 items 
assessing the frequency with which participants experienced specific racist events in the last 6 
weeks. The scale includes items such as, “How many times have you been treated unfairly by 
your coworkers, fellow students and colleagues because you are Black?” which participants rated 
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on a 1 (the event never happened to me) to 6 (the event happens almost all of the time) scale. The 
average score was taken as an index of blatant racism frequency. The reliability of the SRE in 
this sample was 0.92.  
Racial microaggressions. To measure experiences of racial microaggressions, 
participants completed the Racial and Ethnic Microaggressions Scale (REMS; Nadal, 2011), 
which consisted of 45 items assessing the frequency with which participants experienced various 
types of racial microaggressions. The scale includes items such as “Someone assumed that I 
would not be educated because of my race,” and “I was told that people of color do not 
experience racism anymore,” which participants rated on a 0 (I did not experience this event in 
the past six weeks) to 5 (I experienced this event 5 or more times in the past six weeks) scale. 
For the purposes of this study, we only calculated an average score based only on the 
interpersonal racial microaggressions subscales (assumptions of inferiority, second-class citizen, 
exoticization, microinvalidations, and workplace; 38 items). Consistent with the original scale 
construction study (Nadal, 2011), the pattern of correlations for environmental microaggressions 
among the REMS subscales diverged from the other subscales (i.e., low correlations [~0.29] 
compared to other subscales [~0.62]) and therefore was not included in the total score. The 
reliability of the REMS in our sample was 0.96.  
Gendered racial microaggressions. To measure the frequency of experiencing gendered 
racial microaggressions, we used the Gendered Racial Microaggressions Scale (GRMS, Lewis & 
Neville, 2015), which is composed of four subscales (Assumptions of Beauty and Sexual 
Objectification, Silenced and Marginalized, Strong Black Woman, Angry Black Woman). 
Participants reported the frequency with which they experienced various gendered racial 
microaggressions (e.g., “Negative comments about my hair when natural” and “Someone has 
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tried to ‘put me in my place’”) and rated how stressful they perceived those experiences to be. 
Given our interest in frequency, we used 23 of the items to calculate the total frequency score (as 
per authors instructions). The reliability of the GRMS in this sample was 0.93.  
Mediator Variables 
Anticipatory race-related fear. To assess race-related hypervigilance, participants 
completed the Anticipatory Bodily Alarm Response Subscale of the Prolonged Activation and 
Anticipatory Race-Related Stress Scale (PARS-B; Utsey et al., 2013. This 4-item scale included 
items such as, “I can feel my hands start to shake whenever I think I am about to experience 
racism,” which participants rate agreement with on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). The reliability of the PARS-B in this sample was 0.88.  
Anticipatory race-related anxiety. To assess anticipation of racial discrimination, 
participants completed the Anticipatory Race-Related Stress subscale of the Prolonged 
Activation and Anticipatory Race-Related Stress Scale (PARS-A; Utsey et al., 2013). The 5-item 
subscale included items such as, “When I am around White people, I expect them to say or do 
something racist,” which participants rated agreement with on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). The reliability of the PARS-A in this sample was 0.77, which is lower than 
ideal, but slightly higher than in the original scale construction study (a = .70; Utsey et al., 2013).  
Hopefulness. To assess hope, participants completed the Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) 
Pathways subscale, which is recommended for use in non-clinical samples (Steed, 2001). 
Participants rated the extent to which four items applied to them (e.g., “Even when I get 
discouraged, I know I can find a way out of the problem” and “I can think of many ways to get 
the things in life that are important to me”) on a scale of 1 (definitely false) to 4 (definitely true). 
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For this scale, a higher number means more endorsement of hopefulness. The reliability for the 
Hope-P in this sample was 0.76.  
Rumination. To assess general rumination, participants completed the Ruminative 
Reflection Questionnaire- Rumination Subscale (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). For this 12-
item scale, participants rated their tendency to engage in ruminative behaviors (e.g., “I spend a 
great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or disappointing moments” and “I tend to 
‘ruminate’ or dwell over things that happen to me for a really long time afterward) on a scale of 
1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The reliability for the RRQ in this sample was 0.91.  
Moderator Variables.  
Attention bias to threat. The goal of the Dot Probe Task was to assess attention bias to 
threat, or the capacity to disengage from threatening stimuli. In this task, attention bias to threat 
was operationalized as the relative length of time it took to respond to a particular probe (e.g., 
“X”) when it appeared on the screen after, or in the place of, a threatening (e.g., angry) versus 
neutral image. At the start of the task, participants were told they would see a pair of images of 
faces on the screen, followed by an “X” that would appear either on the right or the left side of 
the screen. They were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to this probe by pressing the 
“e” key if the X showed up on the left of the screen, and the “i” key if the X showed up on the 
right side of the screen. They were told to use their index fingers, look at both of the images 
while they were on the screen, and complete the task as quickly and accurately as they could.  
Participants completed a total of 210 trials, divided into four blocks: practice (10), 
angry/neutral (80), happy/neutral (80), and neutral/neutral (40). Each trial began with a fixation 
point (500ms), followed by the target face pairs (1000ms), and then the probe (1000ms). Only 
trials with correct responses were included. The placement (left, right) of the target images and 
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subsequent probe was randomized. For example, for the angry/neutral block, half of the time the 
probe appeared immediately after the threatening image (congruent trials), and half of the time it 
appeared after the neutral image (incongruent trials). The task was counterbalanced such that half 
of participants completed the angry/neutral block first, and half completed the happy/neutral 
block first. The neutral/neutral block was always presented at the end. This task included 120 
images of 20 unique individuals (six White men and women, and four Black men women). Each 
individual was depicted in six unique images: angry, happy and neutral (half mouth opened, and 
half mouth closed). Across all trials, the image pairs depicted the same individual with two 
different facial expressions.  
Attention bias to threat was calculated by subtracting the mean latency of the congruent 
trials from the mean latency of incongruent trials. A larger number would suggest greater 
attention to bias to threat (or difficulty disengaging from threat) because it would mean 
individuals responded more quickly to the probe when it appeared in the place of or “behind” a 
threatening image (congruent) relative to a neutral image (incongruent). If individuals did not 
have difficulty disengaging from threatening stimuli (i.e., do not have an attention bias to threat), 
they would be expected to respond just as quickly to the probes when they appeared behind the 
threatening images as they did to the neutral images. A smaller number would suggest attention 
bias away from threat because it would mean individuals responded more quickly to the probe 
when it appeared in the place of a non-threatening image relative to a threatening image. From 
this task, attention to threat was calculated using the angry/neutral block and attention to positive 
emotions using the happy/neutral block. In this study, we used the bias score derived from the 
angry/neutral block. Previous research shows that individuals high in anxiety have a bias toward 
threatening stimuli (for a review, see Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
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e-Stroop and Stroop Task. To assess inhibition via interference, participants completed 
the e-Stroop and Stroop interference task (Stroop, 1935), which has been associated with 
depression (for a review, see Epp, Dobson, Dozois, & Frewen, 2012) and has been used in 
studies with African American undergraduate students (Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005). 
Consistent with Compton et al.’s (2003) design, participants completed a total of 10 blocks and 
160 trials, consisting of five neutral blocks, two negative stimuli blocks (high arousal and low 
arousal), two positive stimuli blocks (high arousal and low arousal) and one color word block. 
The overall task was counterbalanced such that a neutral block was completed between each of 
the emotionally-valenced blocks, and the color block was completed at the end (total of 24 
different orders).  
Each block consisted of 16 trials, with eight words presented twice within each block. At 
the start of the task, participants were instructed to indicate the color in which each word was 
printed on the screen while ignoring what the words actually said. They completed a practice 
block where they learned to press different keyboard letters for different colors (red, green, blue 
and yellow). Each of the four neutral blocks consisted of eight different words following a 
particular theme, such as “dawn, day, today” and “bank, mortgage, sell.” The four blocks were 
then averaged to create a mean neutral block latency (NEU). In the negative blocks, participants 
viewed eight low arousal words (Neg-Lo; e.g., gloom, lonely, misery) and eight high arousal 
words (Neg-Hi; e.g., danger, hell, panic). In the positive blocks, they viewed eight low arousal 
words (Pos-Lo; e.g., bless, comfort, safe) and eight high arousal words (Pos-Hi; e.g., excite, 
desire, ecstasy). Finally, in the color block, participants viewed words indicating various colors 
(COL e.g., purple, gold, white, black). From this task, five indices were calculated: negative low 
arousal bias (Neg-Lo-Neu), negative high arousal bias (Neg-Hi-Neu), positive low arousal bias 
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(Pos-Lo-Neu), positive high arousal bias (Pos-Hi-Neu), and color (COL-neu). Greater scores 
suggest greater latency for target block relative to neutral blocks, and therefore, greater difficulty 




CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYTIC APPROACH 
 The research questions proposed in this study required identifying a potential mechanism 
(cognitive process) of a particular association (racial discrimination-psychopathology), and 
examining whether that effect is contingent on the presence of another factor (cognitive 
vulnerability). One appropriate statistical approach is moderated mediation, which refers to a 
conditional process analysis that tests whether the mechanism linking X to Y (i.e., indirect effect) 
depends on a fourth moderating variable (i.e., conditional indirect effect; Hayes 2013; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  
Focusing just on the mediation part of the model (see Figure 1b), the a pathway 
quantifies how much two people that differ by one unit of X are estimated to differ on M, 
whereas the b1 pathway quantifies how much two people (who are equal on X) who differ by one 
unit on M are estimated to differ on Y. For example, if one person has experienced a substantial 
amount of discrimination compared to another person, a would tell you how much you can 
expect them to differ on cognitive processes. Assuming two people have experienced the same 
amount of discrimination but have different cognitive processes, b tells you how much you 
should expect them to differ in their level of psychopathology. The indirect effect is the product 
of these two paths, and it tells you that two people who differ by one unit on X are estimated to 
differ by ab units on Y as a result of the effect of X on M, which in turn, affects Y. Thus ab tells 
us how much more psychopathology we can expect someone to have as a result of how racial 
discrimination affects cognitive processes.  
To make inferences about the importance of ab, Hayes (2013) proposes the use of 
bootstrapping, which uses a resampling with replacement method. Essentially, what happens is 
that the sample of participants is treated as a miniature representation of the population, and 
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observations are resampled a particular number of times (k) to create a distribution of effects. 
After this process is repeated thousands of times (10,000 times for all analyses reported here) to 
create a sampling distribution, we examine the extremes of the distribution (lower 5% and upper 
5%), known as 95% confidence intervals. If the interval contains the value of “0” then one 
cannot be confident of a true mediation effect.  
Moderation analyses ask whether the effect of one variable on another depends on a third 
variable. While moderation can occur at any part of the mediational process, we have a priori 
hypotheses specifying that the moderator, V, will moderate the b path. Thus, the effect of M on Y 
is proposed to be a function of V, meaning that how much two people differ on cognitive 
vulnerabilities that differ on one unit of racial discrimination are estimated to differ in 
psychopathology indirectly through racial discrimination’s effect on cognitive processes, which, 
in turn, influences psychopathology. If moderation is occurring, you would expect that the size 
of the indirect effect would differ based on the moderator variable. To probe a significant 
interaction, confidence intervals are generated for the indirect effects at different levels of the 
moderator (1 SD below the mean, mean, and 1 SD above the mean). The conditional indirect 
effects or point estimates are symbolized by w. 
For each of the three outcomes (Model 1 = anxious arousal, Model 2 = anxious 
apprehension, Model 3 = anhedonia), the model was tested five times. The first variant of the 
analyses used blatant racism as a predictor (Models 1a, 2a, 3a), the second variant used racial 
microaggressions as a predictor (Models 1b, 2b, 3b), and the third variant used gendered racial 
microaggressions as a predictor (Models 1c, 2c, 3c). The fourth and fifth variants examined 
whether the conditional indirect effect differed based on gender (i.e., moderated moderated 
mediation) with both blatant racism (Models 1d, 2d, 3d) and racial microaggressions (Models 1e, 
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2e, 3e) as predictors. We used the PROCESS Macro in SPSS to conduct these analyses (Hayes, 
2013). As recommended by Hayes (2013), we report unstandardized coefficients using mean 
centered variables (specifically, X, M, and V were mean centered). Confidence intervals for the 
population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) 
and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping methods. As represented in Figure 2b, the main estimated 
equation is as follows:  
Y = i2 + c¢X + b1M + b2V + b3MV + eY 
where X is the independent or predictor variable (racial discrimination), Y is the dependent or 
outcome variable (psychopathology), M is the mediating variable (cognitive process) and V is the 
moderator variable (cognitive vulnerability). The first component represents the value of the 
constant, c¢ represents the direct effect of X on Y, b1 represents the effect of M on Y controlling 
for X, b2 represents the main effect of the moderator, b3 represents the strength of the cross-
product of M and V to predict Y controlling for X, and eY  refers to the regression residual. In the 
fourth and five variants of the model reported above, gender (Q) is added as a moderator to 
estimate this equation:  
Y = i2 + c¢X + b1M + b2V + b3Q + b4VQ + b5MV + b6MQ+ b7MVQ + eY 
where the first component represents the value of the constant, c¢ represents the direct effect of X 
on Y, b1 represents the effect of M on Y controlling for X, b2 represents the main effect of the 
moderator, b3 represents the effect of Q (gender; women coded as 2), b4 represents the strength of 
the cross-product of V and Q (attention bias and gender), b5  represents the strength of the cross-
product of M and V (cognitive process and cognitive vulnerability), b6 represents the cross-
product of M and Q (cognitive process and gender), b7 represents the interaction between the 
cognitive process, cognitive vulnerability and gender, and eY  refers to the regression residual. 
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CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the study variables can be found in 
Table 2. In general, the correlations between the central variables (racial discrimination and 
psychopathology) were significant and in the expected direction for all three operationalizations 
of racial discrimination (blatant racism, racial microaggressions, and gendered racial 
microaggressions). With the exception of hopefulness, all of the mediators were significantly 
associated with the racial discrimination and psychopathology measures in the expected direction. 
Interestingly, there was a positive relationship between experiences with racial discrimination 
and hopefulness, which we will explore in greater detail in the context of the moderated 
mediation analyses.  
Model 1: Conditional indirect effect of racial discrimination (X) on anxious arousal (Y) 
through bodily alarm (M) conditioned on the value of V (attention bias to threat) 
 Model 1a. In the first variant of Model 1 with blatant racism (SRE) as the predictor (see 
Table 3 and Figures 2a-b), the results of the overall moderated mediation model were significant 
F(4, 245) = 10.12, p <.001 and accounted for 14.2% of the variance. In predicting anxious 
arousal, the direct effect of blatant racism was significant (c¢ = 0.18, 95%CI; 0.11 to 0.25, p < 
0.001), the effect of anticipatory race-related fear was marginally significant, (b1 = 0.04, 95%CI: 
-0.01 to 0.09, p = 0.08), the effect of attention to threat was not significant, (b2 = 0.001, 95%CI: -
0.002 to 0.003, p = 0.71), and the interaction between anticipatory race-related fear and attention 
bias was marginally significant (b3 = 0.002, 95%CI: -0.000 to 0.004, p = 0.09). Using the mean 
as well as one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean, we 
examined the bootstrap-derived confidence intervals of the indirect effect based on level of the 
moderator, which can be found in the bottom portion of Table 3. We can see that at low levels 
 34 
(i.e., less bias toward threat) and mean levels of attention bias, the indirect effects included zero 
in the intervals (wlow = 0.002, 95%CI: -0.031, 0.043; (wmean = 0.022, 95%CI: -0.003, 0.053), 
whereas at high levels of attention bias (i.e., bias toward or difficulty disengaging from threat) 
the effect was entirely above zero and considered statistically significant (whigh = 0.043, 95%CI: 
0.003 to 0.093). These results support the hypothesis that the indirect effect of blatant racism on 
anxious arousal through anticipatory race-related fear is conditioned on the degree of attention 
bias, such that the effect is only significant among people who have a relatively higher attention 
bias to threat.  
Model 1b. With racial microaggressions as the predictor, the overall moderated mediation 
model followed a similar pattern of results (see Figures 2c-d), including a marginally significant 
interaction between anticipatory race-related fear and attention bias (b3 = 0.002, 95%CI: -0.000 
to 0.004, p = 0.07) and accounted for 10.6% of the variance, F(4, 245) = 7.46, p <.001 (see Table 
4 ). The point estimates representing the indirect effect of racial microaggressions on anxious 
arousal through anticipatory race-related fear conditioned on attention bias revealed a similar 
pattern to the indirect of racial discrimination (see Table 4). At low levels of attention bias, the 
indirect effect was not significant (wlow = 0.007, 95%CI: -0.022 to 0.046), whereas at mean and 
high levels of attention bias, the effects were entirely above zero (wmean = 0.026, 95%CI: 0.005 to 
0.059; whigh = 0.045, 95%CI: 0.013 to 0.096). Consistent with Model 1a, these results support the 
hypothesis that the indirect effect of racial microaggressions on anxious arousal through 
anticipatory race-related fear is conditioned on the degree of attention bias, such that the effect is 
only significant among people who have a relatively higher attention bias to threat. 
Model 1c. Though the overall model with gendered racial microaggressions as a predictor 
was significant and accounted for 9.1% of the variance, the pattern of results diverged from 
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blatant racism and racial microaggressions, F(4, 178) = 4.43, p < 0.001 (see Table 5 and Figures 
2e-f). In this model, anticipatory race-related fear did not emerge as a significant predictor of 
anxious arousal (controlling for gendered racial microaggressions) and the interaction between 
anticipatory race-related fear and attention to threat was not significant. As can be seen by the 
point estimates (bottom portion of Table 5), the confidence intervals for the indirect effect 
contain zero at all levels of the moderator. These results suggest that the relationship between 
gendered racial microaggressions and anxious arousal cannot be partially accounted for by 
anticipatory race-related fear.  
Model 1d. Adding gender as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship (with 
blatant racism as the predictor) revealed an interesting pattern of results (see Table 6 and Figures 
2g-h). The overall model was significant F(8, 241) = 6.46, p < 0.001 and accounted for 17.7% of 
the variance, but the pattern of the results differed compared to Model 1a in that anticipatory 
race-related fear was no longer a significant predictor of anxious arousal, and the interaction 
between attention bias and anticipatory race-related fear was no longer marginally significant. 
Though there was not a main effect of gender (b3 = 0.064, 95%CI: -0.07 to 0.200, p = 0.36), or 
interaction between gender and anticipatory race-related fear (b6 = -0.075, 95%CI: -0.209 to 
0.058, p = 0.27), or three-way interaction between gender, anticipatory race-related fear and 
attention bias (b7 = -0.002, 95%CI: -0.070 to 0.010, p = 0.72), there was a significant interaction 
between gender and attention biases in predicting anxious arousal (b4 = 0.01, 95%CI: 0.000 to 
0.017, p = .05).  
To follow-up on this interaction, we conducted a regression analysis with gender and 
attention bias predicting anxious arousal (controlling for blatant racism) revealing a significant 
overall model F(4, 245) = 12.04, p < 0.001, which accounted for 16.4% of the variance. 
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Specifically, the results included a significant effect for attention biases (b1 = -0.02, 95%CI: -
0.025 to -0.010, p = 0.003), marginally significant effect for gender (b2 = 0.11, 95%CI: -0.01 
to .23, p = 0.09) and a significant effect for their interaction (b3 = 0.01, 95%CI: 0.003 to 0.015, p 
= 0.002). The increase in R2 as a result of including the interaction was also significant F(1,245) 
= 10.07, p = 0.002. To probe this interaction, we computed simple slopes examining gender and 
found that for men, the effect of attention bias on anxious arousal was significant and negative 
(q(x®y)|M=1=-0.006, 95%CI: -0.011 to -0.002, p = 0.01), whereas for women, the effect was 
marginally significant and positive (q(x®y)|M=2= 0.003, 95%CI: -0.000 to 0.006, p = 0.06). These 
results suggest that for men, greater difficulty disengaging from threat was associated with lower 
anxious arousal, and for women, greater difficulty disengaging from threat was associated with 
higher anxious arousal.  
Model 1e. The pattern of results with racial microaggressions as a predictor was identical 
to that reported in Model 1d, including a significant interaction between gender and attention 
bias (see Table 7 and Figures 2i-j). The follow-up analyses in Model 1d were replicated, this 
time controlling for experiences of racial microaggressions (instead of blatant racism). The 
overall model accounted for 13.7% of the variance and was significant, F(8, 241) = 4.79, p < 
0.001. There was not a main effect of gender (b3 = 0.05, 95%CI: -0.097 to 0.186, p = 0.535). 
However, the results included marginally significant effects for attention bias (b2 = -0.02, 95%CI: 
-0.031 to 0.001, p = 0.071) and the gender x attention bias interaction (b4 = 0.01, 95%CI: 0.000 
to 0.017, p = 0.05). The increase in R2 as a result of including the interaction was also significant 
F(1,245) = 7.98, p = 0.005. To probe this interaction, we computed simple slopes for each level 
of the moderator and found that for men, the effect of attention bias on anxious arousal was 
significant and negative (q(x®y)|M=1=-0.006, 95%CI: -0.011 to -0.001, p = 0.01), whereas for 
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women, the effect was non-significant but in a positive direction (q(x®y)|M=2= 0.003, 95%CI: -
0.001 to 0.006, p = 0.11).  
Model 1 Summary. Taken together, we found some support for the hypothesis that the 
indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious arousal through anticipatory race-related fear 
depended on attention to threat, with the effect only reaching statistical significance among 
people who had difficulty disengaging from threat (i.e., high threat bias). While this pattern was 
consistent for blatant racism and racial microaggressions (albeit to a smaller degree for the latter), 
it did not generalize to gendered racial microaggressions. Finally, we found that examining the 
role of gender as a moderator revealed an unexpected interaction between gender and attention 
biases, such that the association between anxious arousal and attention bias was negative for men, 
and positive for women (though for racial microaggressions, the effect was not statistically 
significant for women).  
Model 2: Conditional indirect effect of racial discrimination (X) on anxious apprehension 
(Y) through anticipatory race-related anxiety (M) conditioned on the value of V (attention 
bias to threat) 
Model 2a. In the first variant of Model 2 with blatant racism as the predictor, the results 
of the overall moderated mediation model were significant F(4, 245) = 5.05, p < 0.001 and 
accounted for 7.6% of the variance (see Table 8 and Figures 3a-b). In predicting anxious 
apprehension, the direct effect of blatant racism was significant (c¢ = 0.15, 95%CI; 0.00 to 0.30, 
p < .001) as was the effect of anticipatory race-related anxiety, (b1 = 0.17, 95%CI: 0.05 to 0.28, p 
= 0.007). The direct effect of attention to threat was not significant (b2 = 0.001, 95%CI: -0.004 to 
0.007, p = 0.71), and the expected interaction between anticipatory race-related anxiety and 
attention bias was also not significant (b3 = -0.000, 95%CI: -0.005 to 0.005, p = 0.98). Despite 
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this nonsignificant result, our a priori hypotheses specified predicted differences in indirect 
effects based on attention bias and thus we examined those. Interestingly, the point estimates 
revealed the opposite pattern found in Model 1 (see bottom portion of Table 8). Specifically, we 
found that the indirect effect was only significant at low and mean levels of attention bias to 
threat (wlow = 0.09, 95%CI: 0.007, 0.183; wmean = 0.09, 95%CI: 0.030 to 0.167), but not at high 
levels (whigh = 0.09, 95%CI: -0.003, 0.185). It is important to note, however, that the effect sizes 
are essentially identical and that these differences in significance may reflect greater variability 
in observations for that level of the moderator.  
Model 2b. With racial microaggressions as the predictor, the overall moderated mediation 
was significant, F(4, 245) = 5.32, p < 0.001 and accounted for 8% of the variance (see Table 9 
and Figures 3c-d). The pattern of results was similar to Model 2a (with blatant racism as a 
predictor), including a significant direct effect of racial microaggressions (c¢ = 0.17, 95%CI; 0.00 
to 0.30, p = 0.03) and a significant effect of anticipatory race-related anxiety (b1 = 0.17, 95%CI: 
0.06 to 0.29, p = 0.007). Deviating from the unexpected pattern revealed in Model 2a, the 
indirect effect of racial microaggressions on anxious apprehension was nonsignificant at low, 
mean, and high levels of attention bias to threat.  
Model 2c. With gendered racial microaggressions as the predictor, the overall moderated 
mediation was significant, F(4, 178) = 3.84, p < 0.001 and accounted for 8% of the variance (see 
Table 10 and Figures 3e-f). The pattern of results was similar to Models 2a and 2b, including a 
significant direct effect of gendered racial microaggressions (c¢ = 0.15, 95%CI; 0.023 to 0.27, p 
= 0.02) and a significant effect of anticipatory race-related anxiety (b1 = 0.15, 95%CI: 0.010 to 
0.284, p = 0.04). The interaction term was not significant. However, consistent with the results of 
Model 2a, we found that the indirect effect was only significant at low and mean levels of 
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attention bias to threat (wlow = 0.06, 95%CI: 0.002, 0.123; (wmean = 0.05, 95%CI: 0.005 to 0.105), 
but not at high levels (whigh = 0.03, 95%CI: -0.038, 0.100). 
Model 2d. Adding gender as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship (with 
blatant racism as the outcome) resulted in a significant overall model, F(8, 241) = 5.78, p < 
0.001) accounting for 16% of the variance (see Table 11 and Figures 3g-h). Interestingly, the 
only significant effects were the direct effect of blatant racism (c¢ = 0.21, 95%CI; 0.060 to 0.355, 
p = 0.006) and the effect of gender (b3 = 0.60, 95%CI: 0.355 to 0.846, p < 0.001), with women 
reporting greater levels of anxious apprehension compared to men. The indirect effect of racial 
discrimination on anxious apprehension was nonsignificant for both men and women at low, 
mean, and high levels of attention bias to threat. 
Model 2e. With gender as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship between 
racial microaggressions and anxious apprehension, the pattern of results was identical to Model 
2d (see Table 12 and Figures 3i-j). This suggested that when gender was added to the model, the 
slight differences reported in previous models became nonsignificant and likely suppressed by 
the large effect of gender.  
Model 2 Summary. Taken together, we did not find support for the hypothesis that the 
indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious apprehension was conditioned on the level of 
attention bias. In fact, we found some evidence, albeit weak, to support the contrary idea. For 
models with blatant racism and gendered racial microaggressions as predictors, the indirect 
effect was only significant at low levels of attention bias (Models 2a, 2c), though for racial 
microaggressions the effect was not significant regardless (Model 2b). In Models 2d and 2e, we 
found that adding gender as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship changed the 
model such that anticipatory stress was no longer significant, and only racial discrimination and 
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gender emerged as significant predictors. While the indirect effect of racial discrimination on 
anxious apprehension was nonsignificant for both men and women at low, mean, and high levels 
of attention bias to threat, there appeared to be a trend where the effect was larger for women at 
low attention bias, and larger for men at high attention bias. However, these differences were not 
significant and therefore cannot be interpreted as being particularly meaningful. 
Model 3: Conditional indirect effect of racial discrimination (X) on anhedonia (Y) through 
hopefulness (M1) and rumination (M2) conditioned on the value of V (inhibitory ability) 
Model 3a. In the first variant of Model 3 with blatant racism predicting anhedonia, the 
results of the overall moderated mediation model were significant F(6, 243) = 18.06, p <.001 and 
accounted for 30.8% of the variance (see Table 13 and Figures 4a-b). In support of our 
hypothesis, there was a direct effect of blatant racism on anhedonia (c¢ = 0.17, 95%CI; 0.057 to 
0.28, p = 0.003), a significant effect of rumination (b2 = 0.49, 95%CI: 0.379 to 0.610, p < 0.001), 
and a significant interaction between hopefulness and inhibition (b4 = 0.00, 95%CI: 0.000 to 
0.001, p = 0.024). Contrary to our predictions, however, neither hope nor the interaction between 
rumination and inhibition emerged as significant predictors of anhedonia (b1 = -0.03, 95%CI: -
0.120 to 0.059, p = 0.50; (b5 = 0.00, 95%CI: 0.000 to 0.001, p = 0.66). As indicated by the 
significant indirect effects of blatant racism through rumination at all levels of inhibition (see 
Table 13, bottom panel), inhibition did not influence the indirect effect of blatant racism on 
anhedonia through rumination. Despite the nonsignificant effect of hopefulness, the results 
suggested that the indirect effect of blatant racism through hopelessness differed based on 
inhibition levels. Specifically, we found that at high levels of inhibitory capacity (1 SD below the 
mean), there is a significant negative effect (wlow = -0.02, 95%CI: -0.057, -0.001), whereas at 
mean and lower levels of inhibitory capacity (1 SD above the mean), the effect was not 
 41 
significant (whigh = 0.010, 95%CI: -0.005 to 0.047; wmean = -0.005, 95%CI: -0.027 to 0.009). 
Thus, inhibitory ability affects the degree to which blatant racism is indirectly associated with 
anhedonia through hopefulness. This means that the buffering effect of hopefulness may only 
exist among individuals with a higher ability to inhibit.  
Model 3b. With racial microaggressions as a predictor, the overall model was significant 
F(6, 243) = 16.69, p <.001 and accounted for 29.2% of the variance (see Table 14 and Figures 
4c-d). The pattern of results, including significant positive effect of rumination and significant 
interaction between hopefulness and inhibition were similar to the results of Model 3a. The only 
difference was that for racial microaggressions, the effect was only marginally significant (c¢ = 
0.10, 95%CI; -0.015 to 0.218, p = 0.089). The conditional indirect effects followed the same 
pattern, wherein the indirect effect of racial microaggressions on anhedonia through hopefulness 
was only significant at high levels of inhibitory capacity (wlow = -0.03, 95%CI: -0.075, -0.002).  
Model 3c. With gendered racial microaggressions as the predictor, the overall model was 
significant but accounted for only 25.3% of the variance, F(6, 176) = 9.99, p <.001 (see Table 15 
and Figures 4e-f). The pattern of results was identical to that of Model 3b, with the exception of 
the interaction between hopefulness and inhibition only reaching marginal statistical significance 
(b4 = 0.00, 95%CI: 0.000 to 0.001, p = 0.061). Though the indirect effects at different levels of 
inhibition ability did not reach statistical significance, they followed the same pattern as Models 
3a and 3b. In addition, the indirect effect of gendered racial microaggressions on anhedonia 
through rumination was significant across all levels of inhibition level (see Table 15, bottom 
panel).  
Model 3d. With gender added as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship 
using blatant racism as a predictor the model was significant and explained 31.5% of the 
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variance, F(12, 237) = 18.06, p <.001 (see Table 16 and Figures 4g-h). Interestingly, the effect of 
gender was not significant (b4 = -0.04, 95%CI: -0.247 to 0.175, p = 0.736), nor were the 
interactions between gender and hopefulness (b7 = -0.02, 95%CI: -0.235 to 0.189, p = 0.83), and 
gender and rumination b9 = 0.00, 95%CI: -0.001 to 0.001, p = 0.21). Neither of the three-way 
interactions between the mediators, inhibition and gender were significant either (b8 = 0.00, 
95%CI: -0.001 to 0.001, p = 0.53; b11 = -0.001, 95%CI: -0.002 to 0.001, p = 0.24). While, the 
pattern of results observed in Models 3a-c regarding the interaction between inhibition and 
hopefulness was similar (negative effects at higher inhibition ability), the statistical test did not 
reach statistical significance b6 = 0.00, 95%CI: -0.001 to 0.002, p = 0.89 (see Table 16, bottom 
panel). Consistent with the results above, the indirect effect of blatant racism on anhedonia 
through rumination was significant regardless of inhibition level.  
Model 3e. Replicating Model 3d with racial microaggressions as the predictor variable 
yielded an identical pattern of results, accounting for 29.8% of the variance in anhedonia, F(12, 
237) = 8.39, p <.001 (see Table 17 and Figures 4i-j). The only slight deviation was that the direct 
effect of racial microaggressions only reached marginal statistical significance (c¢ = 0.11, 95%CI; 
-0.013 to 0.224, p = 0.082). Thus, the only effect reaching statistical significance was rumination 
(b3 = .76, 95%CI: 0.272 to 1.237, p < 0.001), with the indirect effect of racial microaggressions 
on anhedonia reaching statistical significance at all levels of inhibition across both genders (see 
Table 17, bottom panel).  
Model 3 Summary. Across all analyses, rumination reliably mediated the association 
between racial discrimination and anhedonia, meaning that racial discrimination may be partly 
associated with greater anhedonia in part due to increased rumination. Contrary to our 
predictions, however, the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anhedonia through 
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rumination did not differ based on level of inhibition or gender. Hopefulness, on the other hand, 
emerged as a mediator only under particular circumstances. Specifically, the indirect effect of 
racial discrimination on anhedonia through hopefulness was only statistically significant among 
people with a greater ability to inhibit. If hopefulness is conceptualized as a protective factor, it 
may be that it is only protective when people are good at inhibiting. When gender was included 






CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
Building on and integrating previous theories of racism-related stress and 
psychopathology, the goal of this study was to propose and test a cognitive-emotional model that 
elucidated differential etiological pathways through which racial discrimination could be 
associated with symptoms of anxiety and depression. Specifically, the model proposed that racial 
discrimination may be associated with anxious arousal (Model 1), anxious apprehension (Model 
2) and anhedonia (Model 3) through the development of maladaptive cognitive processes (e.g., 
future- and past-oriented negative thinking) that are differentially predicted by psychopathology-
relevant cognitive vulnerabilities (e.g., attention to threat, cognitive inhibition). We found 
relatively consistent support for Model 1, and mixed results for Models 2 and 3.  
Model 1: Anxious Arousal and Racial Discrimination 
The proposed model predicted that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious 
arousal through anticipatory race-related fear would be conditional on the degree of attention 
bias toward threat, such that the indirect effect of racial discrimination will be larger among 
individuals who have difficulty disengaging from threat. Across two operationalizations of racial 
discrimination (blatant racism and racial microaggressions), we found support for the hypothesis 
that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious arousal through anticipatory race-
related fear depended on the degree of attention bias to threat, with the effect only reaching 
statistical significance among people who had difficulty disengaging from threat (i.e., high 
attention bias toward threat). While this pattern was consistent for blatant racism and racial 
microaggressions (albeit to a smaller degree for the latter), it did not generalize to gendered 
racial microaggressions.  
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 Anticipatory race-related fear as a mediator. In general, our finding that the 
relationship between racial discrimination and anxious arousal can be partly explained by 
increased anticipatory-race related fear suggests that racial discrimination has an influence on the 
development of physiological indicators of stress. While we cannot establish the temporal 
sequence from a cross-sectional study, it is conceivable that more frequent experiences with 
racial discrimination may cause individuals to be more physiologically prepared to experience 
race-related threats, which in turn leads to greater hyperarousal. This is consistent with the 
broader literature documenting an association between racial discrimination and a host of 
cardiovascular dysfunctions (Guyll, Matthews, & Bromberger, 2001; Harrell et a., 2003; Krieger 
& Sidney, 1996). Although there are no firm conclusions in the literature about the mechanisms 
through which racism may increase the risk for cardiovascular dysfunction, it is possible that our 
model could shed some insight on these processes. If, as a result of chronic racial discrimination, 
individuals experience more frequent anticipatory fear responses (e.g., heart racing, chest 
tightening) there may a negative impact on the sympathetic nervous system, leading to heart rate 
dysfunction (e.g., hypertension) which, in turn, has been associated with greater risk for 
cardiovascular diseases (Spruill, 2010).  
 Attention bias to threat as a moderator. Our finding that the indirect effect of racism 
was only significant among individuals demonstrating difficulty disengaging from threat can be 
interpreted in several ways. As hypothesized, it is possible that difficulty disengaging from threat 
is the result of difficulties with fear inhibition, a general risk factor for anxiety disorders and in 
particular, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Brenmer et al. 1999; Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010; 
Jovanovic et al., 2010; Sijbrandij et al., 2013). It is possible that the process of being able to 
disengage from threat – or inhibit a fear response – disengages the body’s sympathetic nervous 
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system reaction and prevents a hyperarousal response. Thus, individuals who are able to do so 
successfully may be buffered from the effect of racial discrimination on anxious arousal despite 
experiencing anticipatory race-related fear. Those who are not, on the other hand, might 
experience vulnerability to anxious arousal as a result of increased opportunities for prolonged 
stress responses. It is also possible that inhibiting a fear response involves the ability to evaluate 
a fear-inducing situation as “safe” and move on, whereas not being able to establish the “safe” 
response would lead to sustained sympathetic nervous system arousal. It is plausible to presume 
that the inability to initially inhibit fear response may make it more difficult to effectively 
evaluate a threat, discern safety, and then fully (dis)engage. Thus, given that the ability to discern 
the safety of non-threatening stimuli is crucial for eventual disengagement with threat (e.g., 
hearing a suspicious sound and then determining it was innocuous), its absence – potentially 
maintained by difficulty with fear inhibition – may function to increase vulnerability to sustained 
stress responding through biased attention to threat (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, 
& Holker, 2002). This function, however, may differ based on individuals’ previous experiences 
with threat in their environment, which may be influenced by their social context. For example, 
different social contexts (e.g., gender) may be associated with different kinds of environmental 
threats which may, in turn, result in different functions of threat engagement.  
Gender as a moderator. In our examination of gender as a moderator predicting anxious 
arousal, the analyses revealed an unexpected interaction between gender and attention biases, 
such that the association between anxious arousal and attention bias was negative for men, and 
positive for women (though for racial microaggressions, the effect was not statistically 
significant for women). The result for women is in line with Bar Heim et al.’s (2007) meta-
analysis documenting a significant effect of attention biases to threat among clinically anxious 
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and high anxious individuals, but not non-anxious individuals. However, this meta-analysis did 
not include gender composition of sample as a moderator (and also did not report the 
demographics) therefore making it difficult to interpret our results in a larger context. Consistent 
with our finding, however, one study found that the higher anxiety was associated with greater 
difficulty disengaging from threat among women, but not men (Tran, Lamplmayr, Pintzinger, & 
Pfabigan, 2013). Another study using electrophysiological measures of visual processing found 
that among those high in anxious arousal, women showed greater processing of stimuli in the 
early stage of attention compared to men (Sass et al., 2010). Interestingly, they also found that 
non-anxious men demonstrated greater preferential processing of threat at an early stage, which 
is somewhat consistent with our finding that attention to threat is associated with less anxious 
arousal in men. Consistent with this, another study examining anxious and non-anxious children 
between the ages of 9 and 12 found a strong effect for gender, such that girls showed a much 
stronger attentional bias toward fear-related (vs. pleasant) pictures compared to boys (Waters, 
Lipp, & Spence, 2004). How gender potentially influences the development and function of 
attention to threat as it pertains to anxious arousal remains a question for future research.  
One possibility is that difficulty disengaging from threat may somehow be more adaptive 
for men compared to women. It is possible that because of greater concern about race-related 
physical attacks (e.g., police encounter), the process of attending to and engaging with threat 
provides a sense of security and safety. Furthermore, it is possible that the implicit and explicit 
response to threat may differ for men and women. For example, there is evidence that women are 
more likely to engage in self-blame compared to men (Ptacek, Smith & Dodge, 1994). It is 
possible that after detecting a threat, a bias toward self- (versus other) blame might make it more 
difficult to inhibit a fear response or disengage from the threatening stimuli, therefore resulting 
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in greater anxious arousal. For example, a woman might experience a racial microaggression and 
conclude she is at fault for the incident, therefore prolonging engagement with threat. A man 
may experience the same racial microaggression, but as a result of external blame, may inhibit 
further engagement with threat and consequently “protect” himself from subsequent anxious 
arousal.  
An alternative explanation is that because African American women contend with racial 
discrimination, inter- and intra-group gender discrimination, and the intersections of those 
variants of discrimination (Settles, 2006; Settles, Pratt‐Hyatt, & Buchanan, 2008), biased 
attention to threat may simply lead to a greater detection of and engagement with threat. More 
frequent engagement with threat may, in turn, lead to greater symptoms of anxious arousal. Thus, 
frequency of attending to threat – in addition to bias toward threat – may be a potential 
mechanism of this interaction. In the absence of supporting empirical evidence, however, these 
explanations are speculative and must be interpreted with caution.  
Model 2: Anxious Apprehension and Racial Discrimination  
 The proposed model predicted the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anxious 
apprehension through anticipatory race-related anxiety would be conditional on the degree of 
attentional bias toward threat. Two competing hypotheses were tested to determine whether the 
indirect effect would be larger among individuals who attend toward threat or whether it will be 
larger among individuals who attend away from threat. We found that for models with blatant 
racism and gendered racial microaggressions as predictors, the indirect effect was only 
significant at low levels of attention bias, meaning it was only significant among individuals who 
attended away from threat (though for racial microaggressions, the effect was not significant 
regardless). We found that adding gender as a moderator of the moderated mediation relationship 
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changed the model such that anticipatory stress was no longer significant, and only racial 
discrimination and gender emerged as significant predictors.  
Anticipatory race-related anxiety as a mediator. Our finding that anticipatory race-
related anxiety may play a role in explaining the link between racial discrimination and anxious 
apprehension is consistent with previous research (Krieger, Smith, Naishadham, Harman, & 
Barbeau, 2005). To examine this, it is important to distinguish between healthy worry and 
pathological worry. Various theories of pathological worry (Berenbaum 2010) propose that 
overestimating the probability of a feared outcome partly initiates and maintains the process of 
worry. This idea is supported by research finding that high anxious and clinically anxious 
individuals believe undesirable outcomes are more likely compared to their non-anxious 
counterparts (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & Bredemeier, 2007). Thus, if one has experienced 
more frequent experiences of racial discrimination, it is logical to assume they would expect to 
experience further discrimination in the future. In addition, Berenbaum’s (2010) initiation-
termination model of worry explains this overestimation partly as a consequence of perceived 
competence (i.e., greater perceived competence should be associated with lower estimates) and 
beliefs about others and the world (i.e., believing others are malevolent and that the world is 
unsafe). It is possible that more frequent experiences of racial discrimination may be especially 
likely to lead to anticipatory race-related anxiety among individuals who have low self-efficacy 
regarding their coping skills and greater perceptions of malevolence, particularly about White 
individuals (i.e., cultural mistrust). Whether this consequent race-related anxiety leads to a more 
general worry, however, may depend on other cognitive vulnerabilities.  
Attention bias to threat as a moderator. Our findings regarding the moderated 
mediation effect were relatively weak, in that the interaction between attention bias to threat and 
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race-related anxiety was nonsignificant, but the indirect effect of two operationalizations of 
racial discrimination were only significant among individuals who attended away from threat. 
Nevertheless, these results provide some evidence that attending away from threat may influence 
the degree to which racial discrimination indirectly affects anxious apprehension through 
anticipatory race-related anxiety. Thus, whereas difficult inhibiting fear responses (i.e., attention 
toward threat) may be associated with anxious arousal, over-inhibition of a fear response (i.e., 
attention away from threat) may be associated with anxious apprehension.  
If attention away from threat is interpreted as an avoidance of threat, then these results 
are somewhat in line with the Cognitive Avoidance Theory of worry (Borkovec, 1995). It is 
possible that avoidance of threat increases vulnerability to anxious apprehension through 
anticipatory race-related anxiety by increasing the chances of using avoidant coping strategies 
such as suppression of negative emotions (e.g., fear or anxiety). As described earlier, this over-
inhibition of a fear response may disrupt emotional processing (Rachman, 1980; Spielberg et al., 
2013), which requires access and exposure to the threatening stimuli. By inhibiting a fear 
response and attending away from threat, individuals may protect themselves in the short-term, 
but increase chronic worry in the long-term. Indeed, our results are consistent with research 
documenting an association between anxious apprehension and avoidant coping and motivation 
styles in adults (e.g., Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Spielberg et al., 2011) as well 
as children (Edlynn, Gaylord-Harden, Richards, & Miller, 2008). Our interpretation of these 
results is also consistent with longitudinal research finding that an avoidant coping style 
mediated the association between gendered racial discrimination and general wellbeing in a 
sample of African American women (Thomas, Witherspoon, & Speight, 2008).   
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Furthermore, this vulnerability may increase the chances of developing additional 
vulnerabilities that function as maintenance factors. Consistent with Berenbaum (2010), for 
example, an avoidance of threat may increase ineffective coping (e.g., negative problem 
orientation), impacting perceived competence and consequently increasing estimates of the 
probability of racial discrimination (i.e., anticipatory race-related anxiety). In addition, continued 
avoidance of threat may prevent the development of distress tolerance, which may have 
consequences for vulnerability to other symptoms (e.g., drinking: Buckner, Keough, & Schmidt, 
2007). Similar to anxious arousal, these etiological processes may depend on other contextual 
social and environmental factors, such as gender.  
Gender as a moderator. While gender did not interact with any variables in the model to 
predict anxious apprehension, there was a significant main effect, with women reporting 
significantly more anxious apprehension compared to men. This general finding is consistent the 
broader literature documenting this gender difference in anxious apprehension (McLean & 
Anderson, 2009; Vesga-Lopez et al., 2008; Zlomke & Hahn, 2010). Some researchers have 
implicated the role of gender socialization, noting that verbalization of symptoms is reinforced 
more for women than men (McLean & Anderson, 2008). However, this idea is at odds with 
gender-specific theories related to the expression of emotion. For example, the existence of the 
“Strong Black Woman” schema, which prescribes a certain set of expectations for African 
American women (e.g., self-reliance), makes it doubtful that such reinforcement would be salient 
for African American women (Settles et al., 2008; Watson & Hunter, 2015; 2016). In Woods-
Giscombé’s (2010) qualitative study exploring African American women’s perspectives on the 
Strong Black Woman ideology, a participant explains the way in which these expectations 
influence her attitude toward help-seeking:  
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And it’s always at the times when I’m most stressed. People always say, “Oh, you look 
so calm and you know, you’re just so rosy and”— and I’m thinking I’m just about to 
crumble in two seconds and I think a lot of people don’t know when Black women are 
stressed because of the Superwoman syndrome and especially in the workplace, where 
other women might be able to show their stress. I think for us, it’s harder for us to 
acknowledge that stress, especially at the workplace when you’re supposed to be 
extremely productive (p. 673) 
In fact, it is possible that as a result of pressure to avoid or inhibit negative emotions and 
cognitions, African American women may be more especially likely to worry (Watson & Hunter, 
2015). This is consistent with evidence that avoidant coping style is more strongly associated 
with less general life satisfaction for African American women compared to men (Utsey, 
Ponterotto, Reynolds, & Cancelli, 2000). This may be in part why mindfulness-based 
interventions, which encourage fully experiencing negative emotions rather than avoiding them, 
have been identified as an especially effective intervention for African American women 
(Woods-Giscombe & Black, 2010). 
Avoidance might include both trying to avoid experiencing and expressing a negative 
emotion, as well as an avoidance of situations that may increase the chances of experiencing a 
feared outcome. For example, in a qualitative examination of African American women’s coping 
strategies to discrimination, a participant explained, “Until recently, I would not discuss my 
heritage with Whites. I kept the discussion to subjects that I thought Whites could relate to” 
(Shorter-Gooden, 2004; p. 419). Furthermore, African American women may worry more 
compared to men – regardless of experiences with racial discrimination – as a consequence of 
experiences related to their intersectional identities. In addition to anticipatory stress related to 
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racial discrimination, African American women may also contend with anticipatory stress related 
to experiencing gender and gendered racial discrimination from both in-group and out-group 
members (Banks, Kohn-Wood, & Spencer; 2006; Settles, 2006). Thus, gender may play a role 
both in coping to stressors (e.g., avoidance) as well as the frequency (and consequent 
anticipation of) discrimination-related stressors.   
Anxious Arousal and Anxious Apprehension Comparison   
In general, these results highlight differential pathways through which racial 
discrimination may lead to anxious arousal and anxious apprehension through anticipatory stress. 
The inconsistent pattern of attention bias to threat serving as a vulnerability factor in these 
pathways warrants further investigation. To better understand the complex role of attention 
biases in anxious arousal and anxious apprehension, it may be useful to break down attention to 
threat into more specific components such as initial orientation, avoidance, disengagement, and 
set-shifting (MacNamara & Hacjack, 2010). There is evidence to suggest that these sub-
components may add a level of specificity that would help us understand these effects. For 
example, future studies should parse attention to threat as a way of testing and developing more 
nuanced theories, such as the vigilance-avoidance theory (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wieser, Pauli, 
Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). This seemingly paradoxical theory of anxiety posits that 
following an automatic orientation to threat (i.e., hypervigilance), highly anxious individuals 
immediately then avoid the threatening stimuli as a way of mitigating the consequent state of 
arousal (Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004). While this model has received some empirical 
support (Adenauer et al., 2010; Mogg et al., 2004; Weister, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, Muhlberger, 
2009), studies have not developed theories and tested models delineating vulnerability to anxious 
arousal and anxious apprehension.  
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Vulnerability to anxious arousal, which is characterized as a response to immediate, 
concrete threats (Sylvers et al., 2011), may manifest as hypervigilance toward detection of threat 
cues, which is more consistent with early processing (i.e., initial orientation) toward threat (Eldar, 
Yankelvitch, Lamy, & Bar-Haim, 2010; Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, 2012). Individuals who are 
quick to scan their environment for threatening stimuli may be more likely to consequently 
experience symptoms of hyperarousal (Bogels & Mansell, 2004; Eldar et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, vulnerability to anxious apprehension, which is characterized as a response to more 
ambiguous, uncertain threat, may manifest as an avoidance strategy maintained by difficulty with 
shifting attention effectively (White, McDermott, Degnan, Henderson, & Fox, 2011), which is a 
key component of the attentional control theory of worry (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007). Future research parsing these components is needed to better understand how attentional 
processes play a role in the development of psychopathology as a result of chronic racial 
discrimination.  
Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of further examining contextual 
factors that may have an influence on the particular function of certain processes, such as gender 
(e.g., attention to threat may be adaptive for men; McLean & Anderson, 2008) or environmental 
stress (e.g., avoidance may be adaptive for individuals exposed to neighborhood violence; 
Edlynn et al., 2008). In addition, it will be useful to assess explicit coping strategies (e.g., 
avoidant styles) and meta-cognitions about worry (e.g., beliefs about its utility in preventing 
harm) rather than relying on attentional tasks (e.g., Dot Probe) to infer potential coping style. 
Such an investigation may lead to a better understanding of the ways that implicit reactions to 
threatening stimuli may interact with intentional reactions to threatening stimuli to confer 
vulnerability or resilience to anxious arousal and anxious apprehension.  
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Model 3: Anhedonia and Racial Discrimination  
The proposed model predicted that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on 
anhedonia through rumination and hopelessness would be conditional on the degree of cognitive 
inhibition, such that the indirect effects will be stronger among individuals demonstrating 
difficulty with inhibition (see Figure 10). Across all analyses, rumination reliably mediated the 
association between racial discrimination and anhedonia, meaning that racial discrimination may 
be associated with greater anhedonia in part due to increased rumination. Contrary to our 
predictions, however, the indirect effect of racial discrimination on anhedonia through 
rumination did not differ based on level of cognitive inhibition. Hopefulness, on the other hand, 
emerged as a mediator only under particular circumstances. Specifically, the negative indirect 
effect of racial discrimination on anhedonia through hopefulness was only statistically significant 
among people with a greater ability to inhibit. When gender was included in the model, however, 
these effects were no longer statistically significant. 
Rumination as a mediator. We reliably found an indirect effect of racial discrimination 
on anhedonia through rumination across all operationalizations of racial discrimination and with 
gender in the model. This finding is consistent with broader theories implicating rumination as a 
mediator in the association between stressors and a variety of psychological and physiological 
outcomes (Brosschot, et al., 2005). Though general stress and depressive symptoms may be 
mediated by rumination, it is possible that racial discrimination may be a unique type of stressor 
that is particularly conducive to rumination. In line with this idea, Hoggard, Byrd and Sellers 
(2012) found that African American adults were more likely to cope with racially (vs. 
nonracially) stressful events using rumination and avoidance strategies, and less likely to use 
planful problem solving. Indeed, our results are consistent with research documenting a 
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mediating effect of anger rumination in the association between racial discrimination and 
depressive symptoms among African American (but not White) students (Borders & Liang, 2011) 
as well as an association between racial discrimination and co-rumination with friends about 
race-related issues (Hacker et al., 2016).  
Rumination may then lead to anhedonic depressive symptoms, which Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) posit may be in part due to rumination’s effect on inhibition of 
instrumental behavior. Furthermore, other vulnerability factors may increase the degree to which 
rumination may be associated with anhedonia. Our prediction was that rumination would be 
more strongly associated with anhedonic symptoms among individuals who have difficulty with 
inhibition, but this prediction was not supported. Instead, we found that the indirect effect was 
significant and in the same direction among individuals who had relatively high, average and low 
inhibition ability. Thus, this effect may be so strong that it is unaffected by the theorized 
vulnerability factor. It is also possible that the indirect effect of racial discrimination on 
anhedonia through rumination may, instead, depend on other factors such as social support 
(Negga, Applewhite, & Livingston, 2007). For example, there is evidence that rumination is 
associated with interpersonal stress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and that ruminators are 
perceived relatively unfavorably (Schwartz & McCombs, 1995). The presence of strong 
interpersonal relationships and social support systems may moderate this effect. Additionally, it 
is possible that the process of rumination, including the persistent thoughts of negative repeated 
memories, may engender a pattern of negative thinking about expectations for the future 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), which has implications for subsequent anhedonic 
symptoms.  
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Hope as a mediator.  Our hypotheses regarding the role of hopelessness were partially 
supported. We predicted that racial discrimination would be associated with greater hopelessness 
(or less hopefulness), which, in turn, would be associated with greater anhedonic symptoms. 
Instead, we found a negative indirect effect such that racial discrimination was associated with 
less hopelessness (or greater hopefulness), which, as predicted, was associated with greater 
anhedonic symptoms among people with low inhibition difficulty. Nevertheless, the direct effect 
of hopelessness on depressive symptoms was positive. Consistent with our results, Odom and 
Vernon-Feagans (2010) found evidence of a significant interaction between optimism and racial 
discrimination in predicting depressive symptoms, such that the association between racial 
discrimination and depressive symptoms was not significant at higher levels of optimism (i.e., 
lower hopelessness). Thus, being hopeful about the future appears to have some buffering effect 
against depression, but the pathway to hopefulness as it pertains to experiences of racial 
discrimination is unclear.  
One explanation for these counter-intuitive results (Mattis, Fontenot, & Hatcher-Kay, 
2003) is that racial discrimination may necessitate the utilization of creative strategies to cope 
with racial discrimination and other stressors. Being able to effectively solve problems, in turn, 
may increase feelings of hopefulness related to future goals. Parental factors, such as racial 
socialization (i.e., parenting practices that implicitly, explicitly, purposefully and unintentionally 
communicate messages to their children about race; Harris-Britt, Valrie, Kurtz-Costes & Rowley, 
2007) may strongly influence the development of this ability (Stevenson, 2004). For example, 
parental practices that teach children about their heritage and history and promote cultural 
traditions (i.e., cultural socialization; Hughes et al., 2006) may be particularly relevant. First, 
they can promote hopefulness directly by increasing knowledge of the racial group’s previous 
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successes and triumphs, therefore deterring the interpretation that coping with these events is 
unsurmountable. Second, they can promote hopefulness indirectly through the promotion of 
adaptive coping strategies. For example, these messages may instill a sense of racial pride and 
general self-efficacy, which may be conducive to developing other effective coping skills 
(McMahon & Watts, 2002; Sellers, Caldwell, Schmeelk-Cone, & Zimmerman, 2003). Indeed, 
there is evidence that the frequency of these messages is associated with greater problem-solving 
abilities among African American children (Caughy et al., 2002). As a result, more frequent 
experiences of racial discrimination for individuals who received these messages may be 
associated with a greater belief in one’s ability to succeed in the future. Interestingly, this idea is 
consistent with the finding that the utilization of problem-solving in an African American sample 
was associated with more frequent experiences of racial discrimination (Utsey et al., 2000). 
However, this protective function might only develop in the context of other protective factors, 
such as executive functioning abilities.   
Inhibition as a moderator. While we framed the expected moderated mediation effect 
of inhibition as a vulnerability factor (i.e., that the predicted positive indirect effect of racial 
discrimination on anhedonia through hopelessness would only be significant at high levels of 
inhibition difficulty), we found that the negative indirect effect of racial discrimination through 
hopefulness was only significant at lower levels of inhibition difficulty. In other words, the 
“protective” effect of racial discrimination on anhedonic symptoms through hopefulness was 
only significant among people with relatively higher inhibition ability. Furthermore, the 
conditional indirect effect was positive and non-significant among people with relatively higher 
levels of inhibition difficulty. Thus, rather than a relative deficit conferring risk to depression, 
this pattern of results suggests that a relative strength conferred resilience to depression.  
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The rationale for inhibition alluded to earlier – that an inhibition deficit may interfere with 
problem solving as a response to hopelessness which then increases anhedonia risk – remains 
relevant in its inverse form. In other words, racial discrimination may lead to the protective 
effect of hopefulness among high inhibition-capacity individuals in part because their inhibitory 
capacity is conducive to engaging in adaptive coping strategies (e.g., removing irrelevant 
information from their memory; Joorman, 2006, or problem solving; Gilhooly, Phillips, Wynn, 
Logie, & Della Sala, 1999; Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, inhibition may offer building blocks that 
allow individuals to effectively develop more complex coping strategies (e.g., effective cognitive 
styles; Haeffel et al., 2008) in the face of racial discrimination. Future research is needed to 
determine potential complex relationships between rumination, hopelessness, and inhibition that 
may have implications for the association between racial discrimination and anhedonia.   
Implications  
The clinical intervention implications of this work can be difficult to discern, given that 
clinical psychologists and researchers may experience a certain level of tension regarding the 
examination of group differences or focus on a particular racial group (Hayes & Toarmino, 
1995). Particularly among early behavioral researchers, this may be the case because the goal 
was to identify universally applicable principles of human behavior. To make sense of this 
tension in the context of clinical intervention, Hayes & Toarmino (1995) define cultural practices 
as “events considered in terms of their prevalence in a population and analyzed in terms of 
contextual features that affect the social propagation and maintenance of these behaviors” (p. 21). 
Understanding these practices may be crucial to developing an accurate and clinically useful 
functional analysis, wherein a clinician identifies factors that explain how an individual thinks, 
feels, and acts. While it may be problematic to rely entirely on cultural knowledge (i.e., 
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overreliance on stereotypes) or entirely on behavioral principles (i.e., erroneously assuming 
people generally behave similarly under certain conditions), a dialectical approach incorporating 
these cultural variables in the context of the broader empirical literature may be the most 
appropriate. We strive for this balance in our approach to assessing implications.  
Implications for Intervention: Etiological Factors.  
Treating anxious arousal and anxious apprehension.  
Attention to threat. Our findings related to the role of attention bias to threat in anxious 
arousal warrant further investigation about relevant interventions for African Americans. A 
recently developed intervention, Attention Bias Modification Treatment (ABMT), differs from 
traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for anxiety in that instead of focusing on explicit 
thoughts, it specifically targets threat-related attention biases in anxiety and is typically 
administered using a computer (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Most often, this treatment utilizes a Dot-
Probe paradigm to essentially train individuals, over multiple sessions, to attend to non-
threatening words (e.g., disproportionately placing probe after neutral/happy stimuli in 80-100% 
of trials). In one meta-analysis of ABTM, Hakatama and colleagues (2010) found that across 12 
studies, there was a significant effect of attention bias training on reduction of general anxiety 
symptoms (d = 0.61). A more comprehensive meta-analysis conceptualizing cognitive bias 
modification treatments more generally (i.e., targeting attention and interpretation related biases 
k = 45) found a medium overall effect (g = 0.49) that was significantly stronger for interpretation 
(g = .81), compared to attention (g = .23) biases (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Taken together, this 
data suggests that this intervention may be a relatively affordable and moderately efficacious 
intervention to reduce anxiety symptoms. Both meta-analyses, however, did not report the racial 
breakdown of the samples or include race as a potential moderator; therefore, applicability to 
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African Americans is unclear. Even if they had done so, the racial homogeneity of samples 
within the studies reviewed (e.g., Amir et al., 2009) makes it unlikely that any effects would be 
detected.  
Nevertheless, determining the most effective way to integrate attention bias to threat into 
treatment is difficult, particularly as it pertains to racial discrimination. On one hand, if there is 
evidence of a “pathological” degree of attention bias (e.g., associated with greater anxious 
arousal and consequent impairment), then targeting it through an intervention seems reasonable. 
On the other hand, a clinician’s attempt to indirectly or directly reduce the degree of attention 
paid to racial threat cues could easily be perceived as invalidating or inappropriate given their 
clients’ environments. For example, while race-related attention to threat may very well be 
associated with some impairments (e.g., sleep difficulty; Hicken et al., 2013; Himmelstein, 
Young, Sanchez, & Jackson, 2015), it may simultaneously provide an adaptive function, such as 
avoiding situations that may be dangerous to African Americans. This idea is somewhat 
supported by our gender by attention bias interaction finding that for men, attention bias to threat 
was associated with less anxiety. Further research delineating the roles of threat orientation and 
threat attention allocation in the maintenance of anxiety symptoms is needed to inform 
interventions. For example, one intervention may involve using ABTM to target attention 
allocation to threat (e.g., the amount of time spent engaging with threatening stimuli) rather than 
orientation to threat (i.e., hypervigilance) as a way to maintain adaptive function of racism-
related attention to threat while reducing the likelihood of downstream negative effects (e.g., 
anxious apprehension, anxious arousal). 
Anticipatory race-related anxiety and fear. Treatments targeting specific cognitive processes 
in anxiety-related psychopathology (i.e., CBT) have received considerable empirical support. 
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Research examining the effect of race on anxiety treatment efficacy, however, is mixed (Carter et 
al., 2012). While CBT in general has been found to be effective for use with racial and ethnic 
minorities (Horrell, 2008), some research shows lower relative engagement and efficacy. In an 
intervention using CBT, for example, Gordon-Hollingsworth and colleagues (2014) found that 
relative to White children with anxiety disorders, African American children were less likely to 
attend therapy, less likely be rated by therapists as “involved,” and demonstrated less mastery of 
CBT material.  
One important component of CBT is cognitive restructuring, which involves changing the 
way an individual thinks about a situation, event or belief. In general, the content of the fear or 
worry is typically evaluated and challenged by asking about the probability of the feared event 
occurring (e.g., probability that someone encounters a spider) and impact if it actually occurred 
(e.g., probability that it will kill them). This makes sense, given the assumption that the spider-
related fear is not commensurate to the actual threat of spiders. Of concern, however, for 
participants whose race-related fears or worries play a role in their anxiety symptomology is that 
the calculation of that probability may involve a unique and complex process. Most importantly, 
a social identity approach suggests that the construction of individuals’ cognitions is contingent 
on their group and “collective frame of reference” (Padilla & Perez, 2003, p. 43). The degree to 
which individuals are tied to their racial identity, for example, may influence how much their 
beliefs are influenced by group membership. For example, a highly race-identified individual’s 
prior beliefs – defined as internal beliefs about events informed by experiences accrued (Huys, 
Guitart-Masip, Dolan, & Dayan, 2015) – may include other in-group members’ experiences. For 
example, when calculating the probability that a person will encounter racial discrimination, 
assessing the likelihood of this occurring by only observing one’s own past may be inappropriate. 
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For example, a clinician asking, “How often have you actually experienced this type of racial 
discrimination?” is inconsistent with the way this individual may think about it, which may be 
closer to, “How often have people who look like me experienced this type of discrimination?” 
Thus, it may be crucial to apply social identity theory to case conceptualizations of clients’ prior 
beliefs, and consequent calculations of likelihood of particular outcomes or events. Doing so 
may decrease the chances that a discussion of race-related fear concerns will be perceived as 
invalidating and increase the chances of using the most appropriate, and consequently efficacious, 
clinical tool.  
Another possibility would be to refrain from directly challenging cognitions at all, and 
instead focus on developing more effective coping responses to the cognitions. Such an approach 
is consistent with “third wave” cognitive behavioral therapies such as Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (Arch et al., 2012; Hayes, 2004), which may reduce the opportunity for 
invalidation. Based on research finding that intolerance of uncertainty partially explains the 
association between worry and racial stress (Rucker, West, & Roemer, 2010), treatments aiming 
to increase acceptance and tolerance of uncertainty may be especially useful, and in general have 
been shown to reduce worry (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013).  
Treating anhedonic depressive symptoms.  
Rumination. Given the role of rumination in the maintenance of depression, there have been 
growing efforts to specifically target it in interventions (Querstret & Cropley, 2013) as a 
standalone treatment and as a way to improve the efficacy of other cognitive interventions 
(Watkins, 2009). In psychotherapy, it may be important to use observations and the empirical 
literature to address the specific conscious and nonconscious functions of rumination in response 
to non-racial and racial stressors. For example, it is possible that an individual may report 
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ruminating about a racist incident as a strategy to gain insight into their experience and 
potentially discern the reasons why something is occurring (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, research on the metacognitive beliefs model (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001) finds 
that ruminative tendencies are maintained in part due to beliefs about the utility of rumination in 
helping to solve problems. If these beliefs existed in this scenario, it may be useful to use a cost-
benefit analysis to determine whether rumination is, in reality, serving that adaptive function. If 
it is, an intervention is not necessary. If it is not, then it may be useful to identify its negative 
effects (e.g., negative mood, social withdrawal) and develop effective strategies to replace 
rumination.  
A nonconscious avoidant function proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) might be that 
rumination “serves to build a case that the individual is facing a hopelessly uncontrollable 
situation and so he or she is not able to take action to overcome the situation” (p. 407). For 
example, ruminating about racism may inadvertently lead individuals to build a case that there is 
no hope that racism will cease in the future, and therefore justify not exerting effort. Again, the 
importance of social identity theory emerges here, in that individuals may ruminate about both 
their own experiences with racism as well as others’ experiences of racism. Hearing about others’ 
experiences of racism or reading about it on social media may provide more opportunities to 
ruminate and “build” the case for not trying (i.e., hopelessness). Given the plethora of examples 
of in-person and online based racial discrimination, it would not be difficult to build this case 
(Keum & Miller, 2017).     
For both of these conscious and nonconscious functions of rumination, increasing distress 
tolerance of uncertainty related to racism may be useful. There is some evidence suggesting that 
African Americans must contend with the phenomenon of attributional ambiguity in response to 
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feedback, meaning that they must frequently make decisions about whether the feedback they 
receive can be attributed to a true evaluation of their performance in a particular domain, or 
whether it is influenced by their racial group membership (Major & Crocker, 1993). Similarly, 
the process of experiencing particularly ambiguous racial microaggressions involves determining 
the intent of the perpetrator and reacting accordingly (Dillon, 2016). Given the difficulty of 
discerning intent behind these incidents (e.g., being told “You are so articulate” in a surprised 
tone), it may provide a sense of comfort to come up with a clear verdict either way (i.e., racist or 
non-racist intent). Indeed, uncertainty is an uncomfortable and undesirable state for many people 
(Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012), and it is understandable to want to end it. This may, in turn lead 
to information processing biases. While a pro-racist intent bias may increase distress and 
negative affect, an anti-racist intent bias may result in obliviousness. Thus, at times it may be 
more useful to notice and tolerate the uncertainty of not knowing (Oglesby, Raines, Short, 
Capron, & Schmidt, 2016). If rumination functions in part to reach certainty about a particular 
incident, tolerating the uncertainty may terminate the process of rumination, and reduce the 
opportunities for consequent hopelessness to develop.  
Hope. While our results do not speak to the nature of the likely complex association between 
rumination and hopelessness, we nevertheless know they are associated. Given that hopelessness 
predicts lower treatment efficacy for psychosocial treatments of depression (Brent et al., 1998), it 
may important to address earlier on in therapy. In the same way that social identity theory may 
influence negative expectations about the future, it may also be used to influence positive 
expectations. For example, drawing on stories of triumph and resilience within African American 
history may highlight the likelihood of overcoming race-related obstacles and challenge negative 
expectations.  
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Alternatively, it may be possible to counteract negative expectations for the future by 
increasing self-efficacy related to coping with future stressors. If one believes they will be 
effective in coping with a future stressor, they may feel less hopeless about that outcome 
(Berenbaum, 2010). In light of our findings, interventions such as problem-solving therapy 
(Townsend et al., 2001) may provide effective strategies that, in turn, can increase self-efficacy 
and reduce anhedonic symptoms. They may also increase inhibitory capacity, which could 
capitalize on the potentially protective effect of inhibition (Areán et al., 2010). Such strategies 
may include those occurring at the interpersonal level (e.g., role playing coping strategies) and at 
the community level (e.g. getting involved in activist communities and race-based organizations; 
Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012).   
Implications Beyond Psychotherapy 
Most of the implications discussed so far are limited temporally (e.g., occurring as a 
response to the problem) and only exist at an individual level. Borrowing from a public health 
framework of disease prevention (Gordon, 1983; Mrazek & Haggerty, 1994), it may be more 
productive and efficient to focus on the promotion of positive mental health and prevention of 
psychopathology. According to the World Health Organization (2004), mental health promotion 
aims to “impact determinants of mental health so as to increase positive mental health, to reduce 
inequalities, to build social capital, to create health gain and to narrow the gap in health 
expectancy between countries and groups (p. 17). Psychopathology prevention, on the other hand, 
involves reducing risk for psychopathology and enhancing protective factors. While these two 
overarching strategies differ in their targeted outcomes, they often have shared goals and exist 
within similar programs and efforts. In the context of African Americans’ mental health, these 
two goals may be concurrently achieved by reducing risk through the promotion of resiliency, 
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which is broadly defined as a set of adaptive behaviors in the face of adversity (Theron, Theron, 
& Malindi, 2012).  
Increasing Resiliency and Reducing Risk  
Strategies designed to reduce risk through the promotion of resiliency may focus on universal 
prevention, which means targeting whole population groups that have not necessarily been 
identified as specifically having a high risk of developing psychopathology. Such prevention 
efforts may include targeting psychosocial factors such as racial identity (Neville, Heppner, & 
Wang, 1997; Seaton, Yip, & Sellers, 2009) or promoting strong interpersonal relationships 
(Garber, 2006).  For example, Saulsberry et al. (2013) developed the Chicago Urban Resiliency 
Building (CURB), an internet-based depression prevention program that was specifically adapted 
for youth of color. As part of the development of their intervention, they undertook a lengthy 
cultural adaptation process that involved identifying unique, empirically supported vulnerability 
factors for ethnic minority adolescents and determining the role of beliefs and systemic factors in 
promoting depression (Saulsberry et al, 2013). Assuming the persistence of racial discrimination, 
such programs may reduce the impact of these stressors on the wellbeing of African Americans.  
It may also be useful to utilize selective prevention, which specifically focuses on reducing 
risk and promoting resiliency among individuals whose risk of developing psychopathology is 
higher than average. This may involve using more specialized interventions that target 
individuals with vulnerability factors. For example, these efforts may include programming 
designed to target the cognitive and emotional factors described in this paper (e.g., inhibitory 
capacity) among people who may be vulnerable to the development of psychopathology for 
various reasons (e.g., executive functioning deficits, lack of access to health services, frequent 
experiences of racial discrimination). Further longitudinal research examining factors that 
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influence the development of psychopathology among African Americans is needed to better 
inform prevention efforts.  
Macro-Level Prevention   
Although racial discrimination is just one predictor of psychopathology in African 
Americans, we argue that it is an increasingly important one and therefore should be targeted 
directly. Rather than focus on how to treat the consequences of racial discrimination, it may be 
more effective to eliminate (or at least minimize) its persistence. For example, individual-level 
programs may target interpersonal racial prejudice through racial justice promotion or intergroup 
contact programs that provide education about various topics, such as racial microaggressions 
(Sue et al., 2007; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Cultural-level prevention efforts may target racism 
in the popular culture by launching intentional campaigns designed to reduce racially insensitive 
depictions of African Americans and increase representation in popular media (Paluck, 2009). 
Institutional-level prevention efforts, arguably the most difficult to approach, may target 
systemic inequalities through development of programs that empower communities (Tucker, 
1999) and increase access to resources (e.g., educational; Farkas, 2003). The most useful strategy 
may be to engage in all of these strategies simultaneously to maximize their effectiveness in 
fighting racism, and consequently, the deleterious effects of racism on racial and ethnic minority 
individuals’ mental health.  
Limitations  
 While the theories of racial discrimination and internalizing psychopathology presented 
here are novel in their integration of research from cognitive, clinical, counseling and social 
psychology fields, they are limited in numerous important ways. First, they do not make specific 
predictions regarding the roles of several important psychosocial variables such as racial identity, 
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ethnic identity (Operario & Fiske, 2001; Sellers, Copeland-Linder, Martin, & Lewis, 2006; Yip, 
2014) and collective self-esteem that may moderate the association between racial discrimination 
and internalizing psychopathology (Brondolo et al., 2016). For example, it is possible that the 
degree to which one’s racial group is salient to them may influence the likelihood of either 
attending to race-related threat or ruminating about experiences with racial discrimination 
(Brondolo et al., 2009; Sellers et al., 1998). While these constructs could not be integrated into 
the proposed model due to concerns of insufficient statistical power, assessments of these 
constructs will be included in the study as a part of separate set of exploratory hypotheses.  
Second, these models were tested with a college-aged sample of African American men 
and women. Given evidence that for many, the onset of internalizing symptoms may begin at a 
younger age (adolescence; Kessler et al., 2005), it is a reasonable criticism that the sample 
selection precludes effectively capturing the true onset of anxious arousal and anhedonia in this 
population. At the same time, a significant amount of mental health symptoms have been found 
to develop post-adolescence, therefore it is possible that the model is relatively developmentally 
appropriate (Kessler et al., 2005). In addition, African American students entering a 
predominately White institution might experience an unprecedented (relative to their previous 
context) amount of racial discrimination and therefore its impact may be more likely to manifest 
at this age (Blanco et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it will be important to test these theories in a 
younger and older sample to best characterize the role of racial discrimination in the 
development of mental health symptoms.  
Third, the interpretation of some results was hindered by our inability to capture 
specificity within our measurements. For example, the parameters of the Dot Probe task could 
have been modified in such a way that made it easier to identify effects related to hypervigilance 
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vs. disengagement (Mogg et al., 2004).  Furthermore, the use of a bias score creates some 
uncertainty about the nature of the construct in at least two ways: positive scores could be the 
result of fast reactions in congruent trials (more attention toward target) or slow reaction to 
incongruent trials (delayed disengagement), and negative scores could be the result of a bias to 
fast reactions to the incongruent trials (attention bias toward neutrality) or slow reactions to the 
congruent trials (attention bias away from threat). Further research using more specialized 
methods may be useful in reducing this ambiguity.  
Fourth, the conceptualization and testing of the proposed models may not sufficiently 
capture shared mechanisms of perseverative thinking and psychopathology. While the rationale 
for examining anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and anhedonia may provide much-needed 
etiological specificity, this approach may obfuscate important overlapping mechanisms that may 
have greater explanatory power (Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & Haeffel, 2004). Rather than 
conducting multiple regression models, it may be useful to use structural equation modeling 
techniques to more efficiently capture relations between our constructs of interest. This approach 
also offers opportunities to determine fit indices and test competing models, which may help us 
better understand potentially shared pathways. Well-powered studies are needed to effectively to 
implement these analyses.  
Finally, while the description of our model uses language such as “vulnerability” and 
“resilience,” our ability to actually discern those processes is limited by our cross-sectional 
design. Using a longitudinal design and growth curve modeling techniques would allow us to 
better understand how symptoms of anxiety and depression develop over time, and what roles 
racial discrimination, cognitive processes and cognitive vulnerabilities play in that trajectory. 
This would provide a more robust test of our model, and provide stronger evidence of 
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vulnerabilities actually conferring risk to internalizing psychopathology. Nevertheless, this study 
lays the groundwork for testing growth curve models and providing an initial idea of how these 
constructs may operate.  
Contribution to the Literature 
This study contributes to the literature by proposing and using innovative methods to 
partially test a culturally-informed cognitive-emotional etiological model of internalizing 
psychopathology in African Americans. Studies examining associations between racial 
discrimination and potential mechanisms have largely been limited to self-reported measures. 
Using laboratory-based timed tasks (e.g., Dot Probe, Stroop) advances the literature by 
measuring and identifying relevant cognitive processes that cannot be captured with 
questionnaires. Furthermore, integrating race-related stress theories with empirically supported 
theories of anxious arousal, anxious apprehension and anhedonia may further our understanding 
of why psychopathology develops for African Americans, as well as how it is maintained. This 
deeper understanding of the etiology of the racial discrimination-psychopathology link might 
allow clinicians to develop interventions that may be especially effective for this population. 
Conclusion 
Questions about the role of racial discrimination in psychopathology have the potential to 
inform intervention and prevention efforts geared toward African Americans. One danger of this 
line of inquiry, however, is the potential to reify the notion that racial discrimination exists only 
at an individual level and minimize the broader systemic forces that maintain inequality. It may 
implicitly suggest that the intervention should be at an individual level, “fixing” individuals from 
marginalized groups, rather than fixing the systems propagating the marginalization. We 
therefore believe it is important to understand these individual-level phenomena in the broader 
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context of racism and to avoid oversimplified explanations for psychopathology. Developing 
nuanced understandings of the mechanisms through which racial discrimination influence 
psychopathology allows us to better anticipate racial and ethnic minority individuals’ mental 
health needs. While the ideal solution would be to break down the structures undergirding social 
inequality, as clinical psychologists we must accept the current reality of these structures and 
support people of color in their fight to rise above them.  
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CHAPTER 9 : TABLES 
Table 1 
	 	Demographics and Sample Characteristics (n = 250) 





  Women 72.8% 182 
Recruitment Method 
  Subject Pool 81.2% 203 
Paid 18.8% 47 
Ethnicity 
  Black-American 74.8% 187 
Caribbean 2.4% 6 
African 19.2% 48 
Other 2.4% 6 
Parent/Caregiver 1 Education 
  No formal schooling 0.0% 0 
Primary school through 8th grade 1.6% 4 
Some high school 2.8% 7 
Completed high school or GED 14.8% 37 
Some college 20.4% 51 
Trade certificate 1.6% 4 
Associates degree 11.2% 28 
Bachelor's degree 26.4% 66 
Graduate degree 21.2% 53 
Parent/Caregiver 2 Education 
  I did not have a second caregiver 18% 45 
No formal schooling 0.8% 2 
Primary school through 8th grade 2.8% 7 
Some high school 4.4% 11 
Completed high school or GED 22% 55 
Some college 15.2% 38 
Trade certificate,  3.6% 9 
Associates degree 8% 20 
Bachelor's degree 17.2% 43 
Graduate degree 7.2% 18 
Family Income 
  Under $15,000 11.2% 28 
$15,001 to $25,000 11.6% 29 
$25,001 to $35,000 12% 30 
$35,001 to $50,000 14.80% 37 
$50,001 to $75,000 17.60% 44 
$75,001 to $100,000 11.60% 29 
Over $100,000 11.60% 29 
I don't know 8.40% 21 




Correlations Among Main Study Variables 
 
Mean SD a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Anxious Arousal (MASQ-AA) 1.58 0.46 0.81 
 
- 
          2. Anxious Apprehension (PSWQ) 3.28 0.92 0.94 
 
0.33* - 
         3. Anhedonia Loss (MASQ-AD/LOI) 2.41 0.84 0.81 
 
0.46* 0.43* - 
        4. Blatant Racism (SRE) 2.25 0.82 0.92 
 
0.35* 0.22* 0.27* - 
       5. Racial Microaggressions (REMS) 2.03 0.81 0.96 
 
0.28* 0.21* 0.19* 0.77* - 
      6. Gendered Racial Microaggressions (GRMS)^ 2.87 1.08 0.93 
 
0.25* 0.23* 0.16* 0.69* 0.77* - 
     7. Anticipatory Race-Related Fear (PARS-A) 4.57 1.04 0.77 
 
0.13* 0.25* 0.29* 0.44* 0.35* 0.34* - 
    8. Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety (PARS-B) 2.02 1.23 0.88 
 
0.22* 0.23* 0.18* 0.36* 0.30* 0.35* 0.31* - 
   9. Hope (HS-P) 2.62 1.02 0.76 
 
-0.06  -0.17* -0.09  0.13*  0.17*  0.16* 0.03 -0.07 - 
  10. Rumination (RRQ) 3.50 0.80 0.91 
 
0.27* 0.60* 0.52* 0.21* 0.19* 0.22* 0.25* 0.27*  -0.17* - 
 11. Attention to Threat Bias (Dot Probe) 4.15 21.26 - 
 
0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02  -0.14* -0.05 - 
12. Inhibition Difficulty (Stroop) 168.08 209.93 - 
 
0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.07 0.10 0.17* 0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.01 
Note. * indicates significance at the <.05 level. Dot Probe is scored such that a greater number means greater attention to threat. The Stroop task is scored such 











Model 1a. Conditional Indirect Effect of Blatant Racism (SRE) on Anxious Arousal (AA) through Anticipatory Race-Related Fear (Anticipate-Fear) Moderated 
by Attention Bias to Threat (Attention Bias) 
  
M (Anticipatory Race-Related Fear) 
  
Y (Anxious Arousal) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.533 [.357, .709] 0.09 <0.001 
 
c' 0.177 [.107, .247] 0.036 <0.001 
M (Anticipate-Fear) 
 
          b1 0.042 [-.005, .089] 0.024 0.079 
V (Attention Bias) 
 
          b2 0.001 [-.002, .003] 0.001 0.705 
M x V 
 
          b3 0.002 [-.000, .004] 0.001 0.086 
Model Summary  
R2 = .126 
  
R2 = .142 
 
F(1, 248) = 35.71, p < 0.001 
  
F(4, 245) = 10.12, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of SRE on AA through Anticipate-Fear at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
Attention Bias  w SE CI 95% 
        Low 0.002 0.018 [-.031, .043] 
        Mean 0.022 0.014 [-.003, .053] 
        High 0.043 0.022  [.003, .093]* 
        Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 





 Model 1b. Conditional Indirect Effect of Racial Microaggressions (REMS) on Anxious Arousal (AA) through Anticipatory Race-Related Fear (Anticipate-Fear) 
Moderated by Attention Bias to Threat  
  
M (Anticipatory Race-Related Fear) 
  
Y (Anxious Arousal) 
 Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 X (REMS) a 0.463 [.281, .646] 0.093 <0.001 
 
c' 0.139 [.067, .210] 0.036 <0.001 
 M (Anticipate-Fear) 
 
          b1 0.056 [.010, .103] 0.024 0.018 
 V (Attention Bias) 
 
          b2 0.001 [-.002, .003] 0.001 0.758 
 M x V 
 
          b3 0.002 [-.000, .004] 0.001 0.072 
 
Model Summary  
R2 = .092 
 
R2 = .106 
                   F(1, 248) = 25.08, p < 0.001 
 
F(4, 245) = 7.46, p < 0.001 
 
Conditional Indirect Effects of REMS on AA through Anticipate-Fear at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
 Attention Bias w SE CI 95% 
         Low 0.007 0.017 [-.022, .046] 
         Mean 0.026 0.013 [.005, .059]* 
         High 0.045 0.021 [.013, .096]* 
         Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 5 
Model 1c. Conditional Indirect Effect of Gendered Racial Microaggressions (GRMS) on Anxious Arousal (AA) through Anticipatory Race-Related Fear 
(Anticipate-Fear) Moderated by Attention Bias to Threat  
  
M (Anticipatory Race-Related Fear) 
  
Y (Anxious Arousal) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p     Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (GRMS) a 0.424 [.258, .589] 0.084 <0.001 
 
c' 0.096 [.031, .160] 0.033 0.004 
M (Anticipate-Fear) 
 
          b1 0.032 [-.022, .086] 0.027 0.239 
V (Attention Bias) 
 
          b2 0.002 [-.001, .006] 0.002 0.125 
M x V 
 
          b3 0.002 [-.000, .004] 0.001 0.166 
Model Summary            
 
R2 = .124 
 
R2 = .091 
  
F(1, 181) = 25.53, p < 0.001 
 
F(4, 178) = 4.43, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effect of GRMS on on AA through Anticipate-Fear at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
Attention Bias w SE CI 95% 
        Low  -0.002 0.018 [-.034, .038] 
        Mean 0.014 0.013 [-.009, .044] 
        High 0.029 0.02 [-.002, .074] 
        Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 




Model 1d. Conditional Indirect Effect of Blatant Racism (SRE) on Anxious Arousal (AA) through Anticipatory Race-Related Fear (Anticipate-Fear) Moderated 
by Attention Bias to Threat and Gender 
  
M (Anticipatory Race-Related Fear) 
 
  Y (Anxious Arousal) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.533 [.357, .709] 0.089 <0.001 
 
c' 0.187 [.114, .261] 0.037 <0.001 
M (Anticipate-Fear) 
      
b1 0.167 [-.087, .420] 0.129 0.197 
V (Attention Bias) 
      
b2 -0.014 [-.030, .002] 0.008 0.078 
Q (Gender) 
      
b3 0.064 [-.074, .202] 0.070 0.362 
V x Q 
      
b4 0.008 [.000, .017] 0.004 0.048 
M1 x V 
      
b5 -0.002 [-.018, .014] 0.008 0.811 
M1 x Q 
      
b6 -0.075 [-.209, .058] 0.068 0.268 
M1 x V x Q 
      
b7 0.002 [-.007, .01] 0.004 0.724 
Model Summary R
2 = .126   R2 = .177 
F(1, 248) =  35.71, p < 0.001 
 
F(8, 241) = 6.46, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effect of SRE on AA through Anticipate-Fear at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) by Gender 
Attention Bias Gender w SE CI 95% 
       
Low  Men 0.054 0.055 [-.044, .180]        Women -0.003 0.022 [-.043, .044] 
       Mean Men 0.049 0.034 [-.010, .123]        Women 0.009 0.016 [-.024, .040] 
       
High  Men  0.043 0.070 [-.077, .209]        Women 0.021 0.024 [-.025, .069] 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 





Model 1e. Conditional Indirect Effect of Racial Microaggressions (REMS) on Anxious Arousal (AA) through Anticipatory Race-Related Fear (Anticipate-Fear) 
Moderated by Attention Bias to Threat and Gender            
  
M (Anticipatory Race-Related Fear) 
 
  Y (Anxious Arousal) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p     Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (REMS) a 0.463 [.281, .645] 0.093 <0.001 
 
c' 0.135 [.061, .209] 0.037 <0.001 
M (Anticipate-Fear) 
      
b1 0.171 [-.089, .430] 0.132 0.196 
V (Attention Bias) 
      
b2 -0.015 [-.031, .001] 0.008 0.071 
Q (Gender) 
      
b3 0.045 [-.097, .186] 0.072 0.535 
V x Q 
      
b4 0.009 [.000, .017] 0.004 0.050 
M1 x V 
      
b5 -0.005 [-.022, .011] 0.008 0.521 
M1 x Q 
      
b6 -0.068 [-.204, .069] 0.069 0.331 
M1 x V x Q 
      
b7 0.003 [-.005, .012] 0.004 0.427 
Model Summary R
2 = .092 
 
R2 = .137 
F(1, 248) = 23.08 , p < 0.001 
 
F(8, 241) = 4.79, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effect of REMS on AA through Anticipate-Fear at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) by Gender 
Attention Bias Gender w SE CI 95% 
       
Low Bias Men 0.067 0.057 [-.024, .204]        Women 0.002 0.020 [-.035, .045] 
       
Mean Men 0.048 0.033 [-.004, .129]        Women 0.017 0.015 [-.009, .049] 
       
High Bias Men  0.028 0.065 [-.080, .187]        Women 0.031 0.021 [-.003, .081] 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 




Model 2a. Conditional Indirect Effect of Blatant Racism (SRE) on Anxious Apprehension (AP) through Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety (Anticipate-Anxiety) 




Y (Anxious Apprehension) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
	
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.558 [.416, .701] 0.072 <.001 
	
c' 0.151 [.000, .302] 0.077 0.049 
M (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
    	
b1 0.165 [.046, .284] 0.06 0.007 
V (Attention Bias) 
     	
b2 0.001 [-.004, .007] 0.003 0.601 
M1 x V 
     	
b3 0.000 [-.005, .005] 0.003 0.983 
Model Summary R
2 = .194 
	
R2 = .076 
F(1, 248) = 59.66, p< 0.001 
	
F(4, 245) = 5.05, p< 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of SRE on AP through Anticipate-Anxiety at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
Attention Bias w SE CI 95% 
        Low  0.093 0.045  [.007, .183]* 
        Mean 0.092 0.035  [.030, .167]* 
        High 0.092 0.048 [-.003, .185] 
        Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 




Model 2b. Conditional Indirect Effect of Racial Microaggressions (REMS) on Anxious Apprehension (AP) through Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety 
(Anticipate-Anxiety) Moderated by Attention Bias to Threat                       
 
  X (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
	
  Y (Anxious Apprehension) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
	
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (REMS) a 0.447 [.296, .599] 0.077 < 0.001 
	
c' 0.165 [.018, .311] 0.074 0.028 
M (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
    	
b1 0.173 [.060, .287] 0.058 0.003 
V (Attention Bias) 
     	
b2 0.001 [-.004, .001] 0.003 0.620 
M1 x V 
     	
b3 0.000 [-.005, .005] 0.003 0.969 
Model Summary R
2 = .120 
	  
R2 = .080 
F(1, 248) = 33.92, p< 0.001 
	  
F(4, 245) = 5.32,  p< 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of REMS on AP through Anticipate-Anxiety at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
Attention Bias w SE CI 95% 
        Low  0.080 0.036 [.013, .153]* 
        Mean 0.078 0.028 [.029, .141]* 
        High 0.077 0.040 [.003, .159]* 
        Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 10 
Model 2c. Conditional Indirect Effect of Gendered Racial Microaggressions (GRMS) on Anxious Apprehension (AP) through Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety 
(Anticipate-Anxiety) Moderated by Attention Bias to Threat                       
 
  X (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
	
  Y (Anxious Apprehension) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
	
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (GRMS) a 0.314 [.188, .440] 0.064 < 0.001 
	
c' 0.148 [.023, .273] 0.063 0.021 
M (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
    	
b1 0.147 [.010, .284] 0.069 0.036 
V (Attention Bias) 
     	
b2 0.002 [-.004, .008] 0.003 0.551 
M1 x V 
     	
b3 -0.002 [-.008, .004] 0.003 0.548 
Model Summary R
2 = .118 
	
R2 = .079 
F(1, 181) = 24.11, p< 0.001 
	
F(4, 178) = 3.84,  p = 0.005 
Conditional Indirect Effects of GRMS on AP through Anticipate-Anxiety at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) 
Attention Bias w SE CI 95% 
        Low  0.059 0.033  [.002, .133]* 
        Mean 0.046 0.025  [.005, .105]* 
        High 0.033 0.034 [-.038, .100] 
        Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 11 
Model 2d. Conditional Indirect Effect of Blatant Racism (SRE) on Anxious Apprehension (AP) through Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety (Anticipate-Anxiety) 




Y (Anxious Apprehension) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
	
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.558 [.416, .701] 0.072 < 0.001 
	
c' 0.207 [.060, .355] 0.075 0.006 
M (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
     	
b1 0.071 [-.318, .461] 0.198 0.718 
V (Attention Bias) 
     	
b2 -0.004 [-.025, .017] 0.011 0.715 
Q (Gender) 
     	
b3 0.600 [.355, .846] 0.125 0.000 
V x Q 
     	
b4 0.003 [-.009, .015] 0.006 0.621 
M1 x V 
     	
b5 0.005 [-.013, .023] 0.009 0.571 
M1 x Q 
     	
b6 0.029 [-.191, .250] 0.112 0.794 
M1 x V x Q 
     	
b7 -0.003 [-.014, .007] 0.005 0.518 
Model Summary R
2 = .194 
	
R2 = .161 
F(1, 248) = 59.66, p< 0.001 
	
F(8, 241) = 5.78, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of SRE on AP through Anticipate-Anxiety at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) by Gender 
Attention Bias Gender w SE CI 95% 
       
Low Men 0.036 0.053 [-.065, .142]        Women 0.093 0.059 [-.021, .214] 
       
Mean Men 0.056 0.051 [-.038, .016]        Women 0.073 0.040 [.000, .158] 
       
High Men  0.077 0.080 [-.082, .234]        Women 0.052 0.059 [-.078, .155] 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 12 
Model 2e. Conditional Indirect Effect of Racial Microaggressions (REMS) on Anxious Apprehension (AP) through Anticipatory Race-Related Anxiety 




Y (Anxious Apprehension) 
Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
	
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (REMS) a 0.447 [.296, .599] 0.077 < 0.001 
	
c' 0.195 [.053, .338] 0.072  0.007 
M (Anticipate-Anxiety) 
     	
b1 0.116 [-.268, .500] 0.195 0.553 
V (Attention Bias) 
     	
b2 -0.003 [-.024, .018] 0.011 0.797 
Q (Gender) 
     	
b3 0.577 [.333, .821] 0.124 0.000 
V x Q 
     	
b4 0.002 [-.010, .014] 0.006 0.706 
M1 x V 
     	
b5 0.005 [-.012, .023] 0.009 0.546 
M1 x Q 
     	
b6 0.015 [-.205, .235] 0.112 0.894 
M1 x V x Q 
     	
b7 -0.004 [-.014, .007] 0.005 0.492 
Model Summary R
2 = .120 
	
R2 = .160 
F(1, 248) = 33.92, p< 0.001 
	
F(8, 241) = 5.73, p < 0.001 
Conditional Indirect Effects of REMS on AP through Anticipate-Anxiety at levels of Attention Bias to Threat (-1 SD, mean, +1 SD) by Gender 
Attention Bias Gender w SE CI 95% 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Low Men 0.041 0.043 [-.043, .126] 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Women 0.082 0.048 [-.005, .185] 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean Men 0.059 0.040 [-.013, .146] 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Women 0.065 0.033 [.008, .139]* 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
High Men  0.076 0.063 [-.039, .206] 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Women 0.048 0.049 [-.059, .134] 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 13 








Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p     Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.16 [-.314, -.006] 0.078 0.042 
 
a 0.209 [.089, .328] 0.061 <0.001 
 
c' 0.170 [.057, .282] 0.057 0.003 
M1 (Hope) 
            
b1 -0.030 [-.120, .059] 0.045 0.504 
M2 (Rumination) 
           
b2 0.494 [.379, .610] 0.059 <0.001 
V (Inhibition) 
           
b3 0.000 [.000, .000] 0.000 0.847 
M1 x V 
            
b4 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.024 
M2 x V 
            
b5 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.655 
Model 
Summary 
R2 = .017 
 
R2 = .046 
 
R2 = .308 
F(1, 248) = 4.16, p = 0.042 
 
F(1, 248) = 11.85, p < 0.001 
 
F(6, 243) = 18.06, p < 0.001 





      Inhibition  w SE CI 95%     
 
Inhibition  w SE CI 95%   
      Low -0.020 0.014 [-.057, -.001]* 
   
Low 0.098 0.033 [.041, .169]* 
       Mean -0.005 0.008 [-.026, .009] 
   
Mean 0.103 0.034 [.044, .169]* 
       High 0.010 0.012 [-.005, .047] 
   
High 0.108 0.035 [.044, .181]* 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 14 










Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (REMS) a 0.221 [.065, .376] 0.079 0.006 
 
a 0.188 [.066, .311] 0.062 0.003 
 
c' 0.101 [-.015, .218] 0.059 0.089 
M1 (Hope) 
            
b1 -0.024 [-.116, .067] 0.046 0.602 
M2 (Rumination) 
           
b2 0.514 [.396, .631] 0.060 <0.001 
V (Inhibition) 
           
b3 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.774 
M1 x V 
            
b4 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.020 
M2 x V 
            
b5 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.694 
Model Summary R
2 = .030 
 
R2 = .036 
 
R2 = .292 
F(1, 248) = 7.78, p = 0.006 
 
F(1, 248) = 9.23, p = 0.003 
 
F(6, 243) = 16.66, p < 0.001 





      Inhibition  w SE CI 95% 
   
Inhibition w SE CI 95% 
       Low -0.027 0.018   [-.075, -.002]* 
   
Low 0.093 0.035 [.030, .169]* 
       Mean -0.005 0.012 [-.033, .013] 
   
Mean 0.097 0.035 [.031, .169]* 
       High 0.016 0.016 [-.007, .059] 
   
High 0.101 0.083 [.032, .183]* 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 15 
Model 3c. Conditional Indirect Effect of Gendered Racial Microaggressions (GRMS) on Anhedonia (AD) through Hope and Rumination Moderated by 









Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
  
Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (GRMS) a 0.151 [.014, .287] 0.069 0.031 
 
a 0.157 [.052, .261] 0.053 0.004 
 
c' 0.058 [-.044, .160] 0.052 0.256 
M1 (Hope) 
            
b1 -0.017 [-.121, .088] 0.053 0.754 
M2 (Rumination) 
           
b2 0.483 [.343, .623] 0.071 <.001 
V (Inhibition) 
           
b3 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.851 
M1 x V 
            
b4 0.000 [.000, .001] 0.000 0.061 
M2 x V 
            
b5 0.000 [-.001, .001] 0.000 0.939 
Model Summary R
2 = .025 
 
R2 = .046 
 
R2 = .253 
F(1, 181) = 4.72, p = 0.031 
 
F(1, 181) = 8.78, p = 0.004 
 
F(6, 176) = 9.99, p < 0.001 





      Inhibition  w SE CI 95% 
   
Inhibition w SE CI 95% 
       Low -0.018 0.015 [-.063, .001] 
   
Low 0.077 0.030 [.026, .145]* 
       Mean -0.003 0.010 [-.026, .014] 
   
Mean 0.076 0.029 [.026, .138]* 
       High 0.013 0.014 [-.006, .055] 
   
High 0.075 0.031 [.024, .146]* 
       Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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Table 16 








Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (SRE) a 0.16 [.006, .314] 0.078 0.042 
 
a 0.209 [.089, .328] 0.061 <0.001 
 
c' 0.178 [.062, .294] 0.059 0.003 
M1 (Hope) 
            
b1 -0.079 [-.464, .306] 0.195 0.687 
M2 (Rumination) 
           
b2 0.725 [.248, 1.202] 0.242 0.003 
V (Inhibition) 
           
b3 0.000 [-.002, .002] 0.001 0.962 
Q (Gender) 
            
b4 -0.036 [-.247, .175] 0.107 0.736 
V x Q 
            
b5 0.000 [-.001, .001] 0.001 0.964 
M1 x V 
            
b6 0.000 [-.001, .002] 0.001 0.893 
M1 x Q 
            
b7 -0.023 [-.235, .189] 0.108 0.830 
M1 x V x Q 
            
b8 0.000 [-.001, .001] 0.000 0.530 
M2 x V 
            
b9 0.001 [-.001, .004] 0.001 0.210 
M2 x Q 
            
b10 -0.131 [-.396, .134] 0.135 0.332 
M2 x V x Q 
            
b11 -0.001 [-.002, .001] 0.001 0.242 
Model Summary R
2 = .017 
 
R2 = .046 
 
R2 = .315 
F(1, 248) = 4.16, p = 0.042 
 
F(1, 248) = 11.85, p < 0.001 
 
F(12, 237) = 18.06, p < 0.001 




      Inhibition Gender w SE CI 95% 
  
Inhibition Gender w SE CI 95% 
      
Low Men -0.015 0.025 [-.070, .028]   Low 
Men 0.094 0.050 [.013, .211]* 
      Women -0.021 0.016 [-.067, .000] 
  
Women 0.100 0.034 [.043, .177]* 
      
Mean Men -0.009 0.018 [-.057, .019]   Mean 
Men 0.124 0.047 [.048, .238]* 
      Women -0.005 0.010 [-.032, .011] 
  
Women 0.097 0.031 [.041, .165]* 
      
High Men -0.003 0.027 [-.048, .048]   High 
Men 0.154 0.063 [.045, .296]* 
      Women 0.010 0.014 [-.009, .053] 
  
Women 0.094 0.035 [.035, .172]* 
      Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below 
the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are unstandardized.   
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Table 17 
Model 3e. Conditional Indirect Effect of Racial Microaggressions (REMS) on Anhedonia (AD) through Hope and Rumination Moderated by Inhibition 







Predictor   Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
 
  Coeff CI 95% SE p 
X (REMS) a 0.221 [.065, .376] 0.079 0.006 
 
a 0.188 [.066, 311] 0.062 0.003 
 
c' 0.105 [-.013, .224] 0.060 0.082 
M1 (Hope) 
            
b1 -0.072 [-.464, .319] 0.199 0.716 
M2 (Rumination) 
           
b2 0.755 [.272, 1.237] 0.245 0.002 
V (Inhibition) 
           
b3 0.000 [-.002, .002] 0.001 0.913 
Q (Gender) 
            
b4 -0.059 [-.271, .154] 0.108 0.586 
V x Q 
            
b5 0.000 [-.001, .001] 0.001 0.994 
M1 x V 
            
b6 0.000 [-.002, .001] 0.001 0.867 
M1 x Q 
            
b7 -0.023 [-.238, .192] 0.109 0.834 
M1 x V x Q 
            
b8 0.000 [-.001, .001] 0.000 0.733 
M2 x V 
            
b9 0.001 [-.001, .003] 0.001 0.280 
M2 x Q 
            
b10 -0.137 [-.405, .131] 0.136 0.315 
M2 x V x Q 
            
b11 -0.001 [-.002, .001] 0.001 0.310 
Model Summary R
2 = .030 
 
R2 = .036 
 
R2 = .298 
F(1, 248) = 7.77, p = 0.006 
 
F(1, 248) = 9.22, p = 0.003 
 
F(12, 237) = 8.39, p < 0.001 




      Inhibition Gender w SE CI 95% 
  
Inhibition Gender w SE CI 95% 
      
Low Men -0.024 0.033 [-.096, .033]   Low 
Men 0.093 0.050 [.013, .209]* 
      Women -0.026 0.021 [-.085, .002] 
  
Women 0.093 0.035 [.033, .170]* 
      
Mean Men -0.011 0.025 [-.070, .031]   Mean 
Men 0.116 0.048 [.039, .227]* 
      Women -0.006 0.014 [-.041, .017] 
  
Women 0.091 0.033 [.031, .162]* 
      
High Men 0.002 0.041 [-.056, .089]   High 
Men  0.139 0.063 [.033, .284]* 
      Women 0.015 0.018 [-.015, .060] 
  
Women 0.088 0.035 [.028, .169]* 
      Note. Confidence intervals for the population value of the conditional indirect effects were derived using bias corrected (k = 10,000) and accelerated (BCa) 
bootstrapping methods. The conditional indirect effects estimate 1 SD below the mean, the mean, and 1 SD above the mean. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized.   
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CHAPTER 10 : FIGURES 
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Figure 2b. Model 1a Statistical Model 
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Figure 2d. Model 1b Statistical Model 
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Figure 2f. Model 1c Statistical Model 
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Figure 2d. Models 1d-e Statistical Model 
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Figure 3b. Model 2a Statistical Model 
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Figure 3d. Model 2b Statistical Model 
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Figure 3f. Model 2c Statistical Model 
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